No Bullying Allowed:  A Call for a National Anti-Bullying Statute to Promote a Safer Learning Environment in American Public Schools by Speraw, Adam J.
Valparaiso University Law Review 
Volume 44 
Number 4 Symposium on The Civil Rights of 
Public School Students 
pp.1151-1198 
Symposium on The Civil Rights of Public School Students 
No Bullying Allowed: A Call for a National Anti-Bullying Statute to 
Promote a Safer Learning Environment in American Public 
Schools 
Adam J. Speraw 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Adam J. Speraw, No Bullying Allowed: A Call for a National Anti-Bullying Statute to Promote a Safer 
Learning Environment in American Public Schools, 44 Val. U. L. Rev. 1151 (2010). 
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/6 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Valparaiso University 
Law Review by an authorized administrator of 
ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a 
ValpoScholar staff member at scholar@valpo.edu. 
 1151
NO BULLYING ALLOWED:  A CALL FOR A 
NATIONAL ANTI-BULLYING STATUTE TO 
PROMOTE A SAFER LEARNING 
ENVIRONMENT IN AMERICAN PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On April 20, 1999, the most shocking act of school violence in this 
nation’s history occurred at Columbine High School in Littleton, 
Colorado.1  On this date, two students entered the school and proceeded 
to kill twelve fellow students and one teacher before turning their 
weapons on themselves.2  This incident alerted many educators and 
parents around the nation to the violence that can result from bullying in 
our schools.3 
In response to the Columbine incident, many states adopted 
legislation aimed at preventing bullying and its potentially disastrous 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Alan J. Borsuk, Columbine:  One Year Later, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Apr. 19, 
2000, at A1 (“Although the list of schools that have become sites of lethal violence has other 
entries, none has been quite as galvanizing as Columbine.”); Counselor Marilyn Towsey, 
WASH. POST, June 5, 2001, at T12 (quoting the principal of Liberty Middle School in 
Ashland, Virginia, as stating that “Columbine changed everything” with regard to school 
security and the perception of school bullying). 
2 See, e.g., Sam Howe Verhovek, Terror in Littleton:  The Overview; 15 Bodies Are Removed 
From School in Colorado, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1999, at A1.  Eric Harris, eighteen, and Dylan 
Klebold, seventeen, brought in weapons, including bombs, two shotguns, a semi-automatic 
rifle, and a semi-automatic pistol.  Id.  The two teens were described by other students as 
loners and outcasts who called themselves the “Trench coat Mafia,” and had an apparent 
affinity for violent video games.  Id.  The two were arrested in 1998 for breaking into a car, 
and Eric Harris also maintained a web site and had been accused by a parent of threatening 
to kill her son.  Id.  Despite these warning signs, school authorities and fellow students 
stated that they never thought Harris and Klebold were capable of the violence they 
unleashed.  Id. 
3 See Susan Atteberry-Smith, Five Years After Columbine, Bullying Still a Fact of Life in 
Springfield Schools, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Apr. 20, 2004, at A1 (stating that according 
to some school officials, the excessive bullying of Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold caused 
their deadly shooting spree); Caren Burmeister, Bullies Not Welcome Program Aims to Stamp 
Out Intimidation, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Dec. 20, 2003, at L-1 (quoting a school resource 
center director as stating that “Columbine sums up what happens when bullying isn’t dealt 
with . . . [i]t doesn’t go away and can manifest itself with violence,” and also citing a study 
done by the U.S. Department of Education and the Secret Service finding that of the 
instigators of thirty-seven extreme acts of school violence occurring between 1974 and 2000, 
nearly three-quarters felt bullied, persecuted, or threatened by their peers); Jennifer 
Ralston, Bullies and Bullying, SCH. LIBR. J., May 1, 2005, at 49 (suggesting that bullying was a 
precipitating factor in the violence that occurred at Columbine). 
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consequences from occurring in their schools.4  In addition, national anti-
bullying legislation has been proposed in the U.S. House of 
Representatives to amend the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and 
Communities Act to include measures to prevent bullying and 
harassment.5  However, the efficacy of state measures has not been fully 
analyzed and no consensus has been reached as to the effect of state anti-
bullying statutes on curbing school bullying and violence.6 
Most current anti-bullying legislation focuses on physical and verbal 
bullying, yet other types of bullying, such as relational bullying, can also 
cause violence and other problems.7  While physical violence is the most 
recognizable damage that can result from bullying, psychological injury 
is a type of damage that is hard to recognize and can be very harmful to 
a child’s well-being and school performance.8  Because physical violence 
and injury are relatively easy to recognize and sanction, the main 
difficulty in crafting an anti-bullying statute is being able to 
constitutionally prohibit and sanction verbal bullying and harassment.  
                                                 
4 According to Bullypolice.org, forty-one states have adopted some form of anti-
bullying legislation.  Bully Police USA, http://www.bullypolice.org/ (last visited Apr. 9, 
2010).  These states include, in chronological order of year adopted starting in 1999:  
Georgia, New Hampshire, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, West Virginia, 
Connecticut, New Jersey, Washington, Arizona, California, Rhode Island, Vermont, 
Arizona, Indiana, Maryland, Virginia, Texas, Tennessee, Maine, Nevada, Idaho, South 
Carolina, Arkansas, New Mexico, Delaware, Iowa, Illinois, Kansas, Minnesota, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Nebraska, Kentucky, Utah, Florida, North Carolina, Wyoming, and 
Alabama.  Id.  Bullypolice.org also grades each of these states’ anti-bullying laws based on 
how effective they are.  Id. 
5 H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. (2004) (this legislation was proposed in the 
House and referred to the Subcommittee on Education Reform of the House Committee on 
Education and the Workforce, however, no further action was taken). 
6 See Kathleen Hart, Note, Sticks and Stones and Shotguns at School:  The Ineffectiveness of 
Constitutional Antibullying Legislation as a Response to School Violence, 39 GA. L. REV. 1109, 
1122–24 (2005) (analyzing the effectiveness of state anti-bullying legislation in preventing 
harassment and bullying in schools); Stuart W. Twemlow, et. al., Creating a Peaceful School 
Learning Environment: A Controlled Study of an Elementary School Intervention to Reduce 
Violence, 158 AM. J. PSYCH. 808 (2001) (stating that few programs to prevent school violence 
have been evaluated). 
7 See Joan Arehart-Treichel, Bullying Need Not Be Physical to Have Dire Consequences, 42 
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS 30 (2007) (discussing relational bullying, which is socially manipulative 
nonphysical behavior intended to harm another person, and the psychological pain it can 
cause children in school). 
8 See Denise Lavoie, Suicide Raises Questions About School’s Vigilance, South Bend trib., 
Mar. 31, 2010, at A6 (discussing the suicide of a teen girl who was mercilessly harassed, 
threatened, and taunted, as well as several other cases illustrating the adverse effects of 
bullying); Twemlow, supra note 6, at 808.  This report in the American Journal of Psychiatry 
found that increased psychiatric consultation and zero tolerance for bullying in an 
elementary school raised the standardized scores of the school’s students and resulted in a 
decreased number of discipline problems compared to a control elementary school with 
only regular psychiatric consultation. 
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Therefore, an effective anti-bullying policy must address the myriad 
types of bullying and the different effects such bullying can have on 
students. 
A comprehensive national anti-bullying statute would allow school 
officials to better deal with the different harms associated with bullying 
and would bring all the states into line with a single standard for 
addressing bullying in the special context of the school environment.  
The most important element of anti-bullying statutes needing 
standardization is the definition of bullying and what behavior or speech 
constitutes bullying.  This will help schools diagnose all types of bullying 
and the harms that can arise from them.  The focus of this Note will be to 
define bullying behavior that can be sanctioned without violating the 
First Amendment. 
Part II of this Note discusses the Supreme Court decisions and 
legislation dealing with student speech and the First Amendment, 
provides an overview of harassment and discrimination law under two 
federal statutes, introduces the contents of state anti-bullying legislation, 
and briefly states the limits of congressional power under the Spending 
Clause.9  Next, Part III discusses the impact of these areas of law on 
potential anti-bullying legislation.10  Part IV discusses the advantages of 
a national anti-bullying standard and proposes a model anti-bullying 
statute that could effectively accomplish the aims of prior state anti-
bullying legislation.11  Finally, Part V offers a model anti-bullying statute 
that attempts to balance the competing interests of protecting students 
and respecting the First Amendment.12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
This Note centers on crafting a national anti-bullying statute that 
would effectively deal with bullying in schools.  Guidelines established 
by the Supreme Court’s student speech precedents are important 
considerations in crafting verbal bullying and harassment legislation.  
                                                 
9 See infra Parts II.A–D (discussing Supreme Court student speech decisions, Title IX 
law, Title VII law, and the power of Congress under the Spending Clause). 
10 See infra Part III (finding that Supreme Court decisions and Title IX law are not 
sufficient to prevent bullying and harassment in school and that Title VII can offer 
guidance). 
11 See infra Part IV (discussing advantages a national anti-bullying policy would offer 
and proposing an anti-bullying statute that would accomplish the goals of reducing 
bullying and the harm it produces). 
12 See infra Part V (concluding that national anti-bullying legislation based on the model 
code proposed in this Note would help to reduce bullying and its consequences in schools 
and set the extent to which a school can regulate student speech to protect students from 
bullying). 
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Major Supreme Court cases about student speech help set the general 
limits within which schools may prohibit student speech to combat 
verbal bullying and harassment. 
Below, Part II.A begins with a discussion of the “three pillars” of the 
Supreme Court’s student speech jurisprudence.13  Part II.B examines the 
permissible regulations on harassing and discriminatory speech under 
Title VII and Title IX.14  Part II.C describes state anti-bullying statutes 
and their respective definitions of bullying.15  Finally, Part II.D discusses 
the power of Congress under the Spending Clause to place conditions on 
the receipt of federal funds.16 
A. The Three Pillars of Supreme Court Student Speech Jurisprudence 
The Supreme Court has established three standards, commonly 
known as the “Three Pillars,” by which it measures the constitutionality 
of school sanctions on student speech.17  First, in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent School District the Court established what has been called the 
material disruption standard.18  Next, Bethel School District No. 403 v. 
Fraser held that Tinker is not the only standard by which to measure the 
constitutionality of sanctions on student speech and that students’ First 
Amendment rights in school are not as extensive as those of adults in 
other settings.19  Finally, in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, the 
Court recognized that schools have greater authority to prohibit speech 
in school-sponsored activities if the speech can reasonably be attributed 
to the school itself.20  In crafting a national anti-bullying statute, each of 
these standards must be analyzed as to their effectiveness and use as 
applied to bullying.21 
                                                 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the standards the Supreme Court has established for 
evaluating student free speech rights). 
14 See infra Part II.B (focusing on Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006) claims for student-on-
student sexual harassment, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006) claims for “hostile 
workplace environment” harassment and discrimination). 
15 See infra Part II.C (examining recent state anti-bullying statutes categorized by their 
definition of bullying and looking at their effectiveness of curbing bullying and its effects in 
schools). 
16 See infra Part II.D (describing the Supreme Court’s interpretation of congressional 
power under the Spending Clause and the limits the Court has placed on it). 
17 See infra Parts II.A.1–3 (setting out the standards established by the Supreme Court in 
Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier). 
18 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
19 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
20 484 U.S. 258 (1988). 
21 See infra Parts III.A.1–2 (analyzing the effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s standards 
in the anti-bullying context); infra Parts IV.B–C (setting out and discussing a Model Anti-
bullying Statute and contributions from certain Supreme Court cases). 
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1. The Material Disruption Standard 
Tinker considered students’ First Amendment rights in school during 
school hours.22  Tinker involved students who wore armbands to school 
in protest of the Vietnam War in violation of a school policy adopted 
subsequently and intended to punish these specific students.23  The 
Court held that the school’s condemnation of the students’ peaceful 
expression of their views was unconstitutional because the silent protest 
did not disrupt the school environment.24  The opinion laid the 
foundation for future school expression challenges.25  Tinker is 
considered a landmark case because it definitively established that 
“students . . . [do not] shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.”26 
                                                 
22 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504. 
23 Id.  This policy was adopted in response to school principals becoming aware of a plan 
by a group of adults and students to publicize their support for a truce in the Vietnam War 
by wearing black armbands during the holiday season.  Id.  The school policy stated that if 
a student wore an armband to school, he or she would be asked to remove it and if he or 
she refused, the student would be sent home and suspended.  Id.  On December 16, 1965, 
Mary Beth and Christopher Tinker wore black armbands to school.  Id.  They both were 
sent home, suspended from school, and not allowed to come back unless they did not wear 
the armbands.  Id.  Neither student returned to school until after New Year’s Day when the 
period during which they had planned to wear the armbands was over.  Id. 
24 Id. at 514.  The Court found no evidence that the school officials could reasonably have 
determined that there would be a substantial disruption of or material interference with 
school activities caused by the students wearing black armbands.  Id.  Therefore, the Court 
found that “the silent, passive ‘witness of the armbands’” was not a form of expression that 
the school officials could restrict or punish.  Id. 
25 Id. at 508–13.  “[I]n our system, undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is 
not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”  Id. at 508.   
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to 
show that its action was caused by something more than a mere desire 
to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an 
unpopular viewpoint. 
Id. at 509.  “The classroom is particularly the marketplace of ideas.  The nation’s future 
depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth . . . . ”  Id. at 512 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 
(1967)). 
26 Id. at 506.  See Nadine Strossen, Essay, Students’ Rights and How They are Wronged, 32 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 457, 458 (1998) (Strossen was president of the ACLU and explained that Tinker 
was the high water mark for student speech rights and that subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions have eroded Tinker’s affirmation of student speech rights); Hart, supra note 6, at 
1122–24 (stating that the Court in Tinker shifted the focus for the basis of school power from 
one where the schools had the power to indoctrinate students in the values and traditions 
of our society, to one in which a school’s purpose is to engender views that attempt to 
reconstruct the social order, and that the Court’s conception of the proper role of schools 
has guided its analysis of student rights ever since); Lisa M. Pisciotta, Comment, Beyond 
Sticks & Stones:  A First Amendment Framework for Educators Who Seek to Punish Student 
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Most importantly, the Court held that a restriction on student speech 
violated the First Amendment unless it was shown that the expression 
created a substantial and material disruption of the school 
environment.27  Despite subsequent cases, this material disruption 
standard remains viable and is still the starting point for analysis of 
student free speech rights.28 
The opinion did not have unanimous support, however; Justice 
Black’s dissent immediately called into question Tinker’s effect on a 
school’s ability to discipline its students and to regulate student speech.29  
Justice Black averred that the Court did not allow enough deference for 
school officials to maintain discipline and order.30  In the long term, 
                                                                                                             
Threats, 30 SETON HALL L. REV. 635, 649 (2000) (stating that Tinker is considered by many 
scholars to be “the apex of student speech rights”). 
27 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.  A prohibition of speech cannot be sustained where no finding 
is made “that engaging in the forbidden conduct would ‘materially and substantially 
interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school . . . . ’”  Id.  (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)).  “Clearly, the 
prohibition of expression . . . without evidence that it is necessary to avoid material and 
substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally permissible.”  
Id. at 511; see Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression:  The Legacy of Tinker In the Wake of 
Columbine, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 702 (2000).  Ramey explained: 
[T]he Court set the standard that a student may express his or her 
opinion, even on controversial subjects, essentially anywhere “on the 
campus during the authorized hours,” “if he does so without 
‘materially and substantially interfer(ing) with the requirements of 
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school’ and without 
colliding with the rights of others.” 
Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13).  See also Hart, supra note 6, at 1125 (stating that the 
Tinker test focuses on “the actual effect or results of the regulated speech or expression”); 
Carmen N. Snook, Comment, Oregon’s “Bully Bill”:  Are We Needlessly Repressing Student 
Speech In the Name of School Safety?, 38 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 657, 669 (2002) (stating that the 
important element of the Tinker standard is the effect of the student’s speech, not the 
content of the student’s speech).  But see Hart, supra note 6, at 1125 n.109 (noting that the 
Court considered both the disruptive effect of the speech, as well as whether the act of 
speech was disruptive itself, in making its determination). 
28 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403 (2007) (the Court began its examination 
of student speech rights with Tinker).  See also, e.g., Ronna Greff Schneider, Freedom of 
Expression and Violence at School, 1 EDUC. L. § 2:27 (2008) (discussing recent student speech 
rights cases, many of which began with or included in their analysis, the Tinker standard). 
29 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 515 (Black, J., dissenting).  “[I]f the time has come when pupils of 
state-supported schools . . . can defy and flout orders of school officials to keep their minds 
on their own schoolwork, it is the beginning of a new revolutionary era of permissiveness 
in this country fostered by the judiciary.”  Id. at 518.  Justice Black’s vigorous dissent 
concluded, “I wish, therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on my part to hold that the 
Federal Constitution compels the teachers, parents, and elected school officials to surrender 
control of the American public school system to public school students.”  Id. at 526. 
30 Justice Black believed that the majority had taken the “power to control pupils by the 
elected ‘officials of state supported public schools . . . ’ [and] in ultimate effect transferred 
[it] to the Supreme Court.”  Id. at 515 (internal citations omitted). 
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Justice Black’s concerns seem well-founded, and his dissent has been 
endorsed and cited by a majority of the Court in subsequent student 
speech decisions.31 
2. An Unclear Second Pillar 
In the Court’s second pillar of student speech jurisprudence, Bethel 
School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court considered the constitutionality 
of student Matthew Fraser’s suspension for giving a speech containing 
graphic and explicit sexual metaphors at a school assembly.32  The Court 
upheld Fraser’s punishment because the school had authority to prohibit 
such speech.33  The opinion distinguished the sexual content of the 
speech in Fraser from the political content of the speech in Tinker.34  Next, 
the Court retreated from Tinker’s material disruption standard by 
stressing that the constitutional rights of students in public schools were 
not as extensive as those held by adults in other settings.35  This is 
because of the age and maturity of students, as well as their propensity 
for being impressionable.36 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Morse, 551 U.S. at 417 (discussing Justice Black’s dissent in its analysis of 
student speech jurisprudence).  The Court noted that it had signaled a break from Tinker by 
quoting Justice Black’s dissent in Fraser.  Id. at 418 n.7 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. 
Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986)). 
32 478 U.S. at 677–78.  The speech at the center of Fraser was given at a high school 
assembly where Fraser was nominating a fellow student for an elective office.  Id. at 677.  
Two teachers with whom Fraser had discussed the contents of his speech advised him that 
it was inappropriate, that he probably should not deliver it, and that if he did, he could face 
severe consequences.  Id. at 678.  A school counselor observed the other students’ reaction 
to the speech, during which some hooted and yelled, others made sexually graphic 
gestures, and still others seemed embarrassed and bewildered.  Id.  One teacher even noted 
that she was forced to discuss the speech instead of conducting a part of the class lesson the 
next day.  Id.  Fraser was suspended under a school disciplinary rule that stated, “Conduct 
which materially and substantially interferes with the educational process is prohibited, 
including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures.”  Id.  At a disciplinary review 
of Fraser’s suspension, the hearing officer determined that Fraser’s speech was “indecent, 
lewd, and offensive,” and fell within the meaning of obscene contained in the school 
disciplinary rule.  Id. at 678–79. 
33 Id. at 685. 
34 Id. at 680.  The Court reasoned that there was a “marked distinction between the 
political ‘message’ of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of respondent’s 
speech.”  Id.  The Court also found that the sanctions imposed on Fraser were not related to 
any political viewpoint.  Id. at 685. 
35 Id. at 682 (citing New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340–42 (1985)). 
36 The Court referred to the right of an adult to express an anti-draft viewpoint in 
offensive terms and distinguished that right because the same latitude need not be granted 
to students in a public school.  Id. (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (involving 
an anti-draft protester who wore a jacket into a courthouse that had profane language on 
the back)).  In addition, the Court quoted a Second Circuit concurring opinion for the 
proposition that “the First Amendment gives a high school student the classroom right to 
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Fraser established that a school may restrict lewd, vulgar speech that 
it deems inconsistent with its basic educational mission.37  However, 
Fraser is imprecise, confusing lower courts as to its application.38  This 
lack of clarity results in inconsistent decisions among the lower federal 
courts when applying Fraser to student speech challenges.39  
Commentators differ on whether Fraser represents a new category of 
permissible speech regulation for lewd and indecent speech or a broader 
power that allows schools to regulate speech they deem inconsistent 
with their basic educational missions.40  The Court has specifically stated 
                                                                                                             
wear Tinker’s armband, but not Cohen’s jacket.”  Id. at 682–83 (quoting Thomas v. Bd. of 
Educ., Granville Cent. Sch. Dist., 607 F.2d 1043, 1047 (2d Cir. 1979) (Newman, J., concurring 
in result)). 
37 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685.  In making its determination, the Court recognized limitations 
in its prior jurisprudence on a speaker’s right to reach an unlimited audience.  Id. at 684.  
These limitations include “where the speech is sexually explicit and the audience may 
include children.”  Id.  (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).  Also included is 
“an interest in protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken language.”  
Id. at 684–85 (citing FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).  In addition, the Court 
noted that the freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial views in the school setting 
must be balanced against “society’s countervailing interest in teaching students the 
boundaries of socially appropriate behavior.”  Id. at 681.  The Court also cited to Thomas 
Jefferson’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice, which was adopted by the House of 
Representatives, as well as the comparable rules for the Senate, which prohibit 
representatives and senators from using indecent or abusive language in Congressional 
proceedings.  Id. at 681–82 (citing JEFFERSON’S MANUAL OF PARLIAMENTARY PRACTICE 
§§ 359, 360, reprinted in MANUAL AND RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. DOC. NO. 
97-271, at 158–59 (1982); SENATE PROCEDURE, S. DOC. NO. 97-2, Rule XIX, at 568–69, 588–91 
(1981)). 
38  See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404–05 (2007) (stating that the mode of analysis 
employed in Fraser is unclear and that at best, two principles can be distilled from the 
opinion:  (1) students’ constitutional rights “in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings”; and (2) Tinker’s mode of analysis is 
not absolute). 
39 See Hart, supra note 6, at 126 n.119, 120 (stating that some commentators and lower 
federal courts see Fraser as creating a specific exception to the First Amendment for lewd 
and indecent student speech, while others see it as establishing a school’s right to regulate 
speech that can be seen as school endorsed); see also Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment 
Policies in Public Schools:  How Vulnerable Are They?, 31 J.L. & EDUC. 52, 53 (2002) (stating that 
Fraser allows a school to suppress lewd and indecent speech as a second category of 
allowable student speech restriction); Lynn Mostoller, Note & Comment, Freedom of Speech 
and Freedom from Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment in Public Schools:  The Nexus Between 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District and Davis v. Monroe 
County Board of Education, 33 N.M. L. REV. 533, 539 (2003) (noting that the Third and 
Ninth Circuits each view “lewd and indecent” speech as separate categories of allowable 
speech regulation in public schools).  But see, e.g., McCarthy at 541–42 (stating that the 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits all follow a more expansive view of Fraser 
which simply allows schools to regulate in an effort “to teach ‘habits and manners of 
civility’”) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)). 
40 See supra note 39 (explaining commentators’ divergent views about the import of the 
Fraser holding). 
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only that Fraser stands for two propositions.41  First, a student’s free 
speech rights in public school are not the same as those of an adult in 
other settings, and second, Tinker’s standard is not the only one on which 
schools can rely to regulate student speech.42 
3. School-Sponsored Speech Sanctions and Subsequent Supreme Court 
Cases Addressing First Amendment Rights 
The last of the Court’s three pillars of student speech rights 
jurisprudence, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, involved a 
challenge to a school’s removal of certain articles from its student-run 
newspaper.43  The Court held that schools may restrict student speech in 
school-sponsored expressive activities if the school’s “actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”44  The Court 
distinguished the student speech at issue in Tinker and Fraser from the 
student speech in Kuhlmeier on that basis.45 
                                                 
41 See supra note 38 (discussing the definitive propositions that the Supreme Court has 
distilled from the Fraser opinion). 
42 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404–05. 
43 484 U.S. 260, 262 (1988).  The two articles in question were removed from the paper 
due to the principal’s concerns about their content.  Id. at 263–64.  The first article 
addressed the pregnancies of three of the school’s students and the other dealt with the 
impact of divorce on students at the school.  Id. at 263.  The principal’s chief concerns about 
the pregnancy article were that the false names used may not have been sufficient to keep 
the girls’ identities secret, and that the references to sexual activity and birth control may be 
inappropriate for some of the younger students.  Id.  His chief concern with the divorce 
article was that the student’s parents had not been allowed to respond to the remarks in the 
article or consent to its publication.  Id.  The principal felt that he had to make an 
immediate decision because there was not enough time to make changes to the paper and 
any delay in printing would prevent the paper from being published by the end of the 
school year.  Id. at 263–64. 
44 Id. at 273.  The Court believed that a school must be able to set standards for speech 
that is “disseminated under its auspices” higher than those outside of the school 
environment and that schools may refuse to disseminate any of its students’ speech that 
does not meet these higher standards.  Id. at 271–72.  Not to allow this would “unduly 
constrain[] [schools] from fulfilling their role as ‘a principal instrument in awakening the 
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him 
adjust normally to his environment.’”  Id. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483, 493 (1954)).  First, the Court summed up its holding by stating that the standard it 
established was to be used to determine when a school may decide not to lend its name 
and resources to student expression.  Id. at 272–73.  Secondly, the Court said that the First 
Amendment was only violated when the decision to censor an expressive activity had no 
valid educational purpose is the First Amendment is violated.  Id. at 273. 
45 Id. at 270–71 (“The question whether the First Amendment requires a school to 
tolerate particular student speech—the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different 
from the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to promote 
particular student speech.”).  “The former question addresses educators’ ability to silence a 
student’s personal expression that happens to occur on the school premises.”  Id. at 271.  
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Kuhlmeier stands for the proposition that educators have greater 
authority to control student speech that can be reasonably perceived as 
“bear[ing] the imprimatur of the school” than to control speech that 
cannot be perceived as school-sponsored or acknowledged.46  This is a 
narrow category of student speech—speech that could be perceived as 
attributable to the school.47  Thus, in Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, the 
Supreme Court established three standards for measuring student 
speech rights in the school setting.48 
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minnesota, the Court once again dealt 
with a sanction affecting First Amendment rights.49  Justice Scalia, 
writing for a plurality of the Court, found a St. Paul, Minnesota, 
ordinance prohibiting cross burning and which relied on the “fighting 
words” doctrine facially unconstitutional because of over breadth and 
held that content-neutrality is constitutionally necessary for any speech 
regulation.50  The reasoning of the Court appears to create a new 
formulation of how and why “fighting words” and other categories of 
speech may be regulated.51  Thus, any regulation of speech must be 
                                                                                                             
“The latter question concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, 
theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members 
of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”  Id.  The 
Court believed that this second category of activities “may be fairly characterized as part of 
the school curriculum,” as long as they are supervised by faculty and designed to impart 
knowledge or skills to students.  Id.  The Court stated that educators have greater control 
over this second form of student expression.  Id. 
46 Id. at 271.  The Court supported this holding by stating that this greater control was 
permitted to “assure that participants [in school activities] learn whatever lessons the 
activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are not exposed to material that may 
be inappropriate for their level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are 
not erroneously attributed to the school.”  Id. 
47 Id.  See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
48 See supra Parts II.A.1–3 (discussing Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier and the standards 
they established for regulating student speech). 
49 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
50 Id. at 381.  The Court found the ordinance unconstitutional because it prohibited 
speech otherwise permissible solely on the basis of the content of the speech.  Id.  Justice 
Scalia stated that “fighting words” as well as other presumably less-protected categories of 
speech could only “consistently with the First Amendment[] be regulated because of their 
constitutionally proscribable content (obscenity, defamation, etc.)—not that they are categories 
of speech entirely invisible to the Constitution, so that they may be made the vehicles for 
content discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”  Id. at 383–84. 
51 Id. at 386 (“[T]he exclusion of ‘fighting words’ from the scope of the First Amendment 
simply means that, for purposes of that Amendment, the unprotected features of the words 
are, despite their verbal character, essentially a ‘nonspeech’ element of communication.  
Fighting words are thus analogous to a noisy sound truck[.]”).  The Court stated that, in the 
context of proscribable speech such as fighting words, obscenity, and defamation, 
regulation did not violate the First Amendment if “the basis for the content discrimination 
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entirely content-neutral, but the lack of a clear majority consensus, as 
well as the vehemence with which the Justices critiqued each other’s 
opinions, suggest that R.A.V. does not establish a bright-line rule.52 
The Court’s latest student speech case is Morse v. Frederick, which 
involved a sign that a portion of the Court found promoted illegal drug 
use.53  The majority upheld the suspension and also held that a school 
official may, consistent with the First Amendment, restrict student 
speech that can be reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug 
use.54  In reaching this conclusion, the Court appealed to its student 
speech precedents in Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier.55  It is unclear whether 
Morse establishes a new standard for measuring only student expression 
promoting illegal drug use or whether it changes the entire landscape of 
student speech regulation.56  There is, however, another possible 
                                                                                                             
consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable.”  Id. at 
388. 
52 See id. at 398 (White, J., concurring) (“In the present case, the majority casts aside long-
established First Amendment doctrine without the benefit of briefing and adopts an 
untried theory.  This is hardly a judicious way of proceeding, and the Court’s reasoning in 
reaching its result is transparently wrong.”).  “Any contribution of this holding to First 
Amendment jurisprudence is surely a negative one, since it necessarily signals that 
expressions of violence . . . are of sufficient value to outweigh the social interest in order 
and morality that has traditionally placed such fighting words outside the First 
Amendment.”  Id. at 402.  “I regret what the Court has done in this case.  The majority 
opinion signals one of two possibilities:  It will serve as precedent for future cases, or it will 
not.  Either result is disheartening.”  Id. at 415 (Blackmun, J., concurring).  Justice Stevens 
stated that the majority’s position “lacks support in our First Amendment jurisprudence,” 
“wreaks havoc in an area of settled law,” and “cannot withstand scrutiny.”  Id. at 425–26 
(Stevens, J., concurring).  See, e.g., Adam A. Milani, Harassing Speech in the Public Schools:  
The Validity of Schools’ Regulation of Fighting Words and the Consequences If They Do Not, 28 
AKRON L. REV. 187, 192-94 (1995) (discussing the strong, differing opinions on the 
reasoning used to invalidate the ordinance in R.A.V.). 
53 551 U.S. 393 (2007).  The sign was held by a student (Frederick) standing along the 
street in front of his school as the Olympic Torch Relay passed by.  Id. at 396.  The principal 
asked Frederick to take the sign down, but he refused to do so.  Id.  The principal then 
ordered Frederick to her office and suspended him for ten days under a school policy that 
prohibited assembly or expression advocating substances illegal to minors.  Id. at 398. 
54 Id. at 403.  The Court reasoned that “[t]he ‘special characteristics of the school 
environment[]’. . . and the governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse . . . allow 
schools to restrict student expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug 
use.”  Id. at 408. 
55 Id. at 403–06.  The Court recognized the following propositions from its precedent:  (1) 
the continuing viability of Tinker’s material disruption standard; (2) that Fraser meant at 
least that the mode of analysis employed in Tinker is not absolute and that students’ 
constitutional rights in school are not coextensive with those of adults in other settings; and 
(3) that schools have a greater right to restrict speech that can reasonably be attributed to 
them.  Id. 
56 Compare Charles Chulack, The First Amendment Does Not Require Schools to Tolerate 
Student Expression That Contributes to the Dangers of Illegal Drug Use:  Morse v. Frederick, 46 
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standard stemming from congressional legislation that has been deemed 
constitutional by the Court. 
B. Permissible Regulations of Harassing or Discriminatory Speech 
1. Title IX and Student-on-Student Harassment 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”) prohibits 
discrimination based on sex in any federally funded education program 
or activity.57  The plaintiff in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education 
brought a Title IX claim for student-on-student harassment.58  The 
Supreme Court definitively established a private cause of action seeking 
damages under Title IX.59  An even more recent decision from the Third 
Circuit, Saxe v. State College Area School District, casts doubt on the extent 
to which a school policy based on harassment can be used to curb 
student speech, but the Supreme Court has not commented on the 
reasoning or impact of this decision.60 
a. Title IX’s Scope and Constitutionality Established 
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court 
established a private cause of action against a school district for student-
on-student sexual harassment.61  This case involved a fifth-grade 
student’s mother who brought a claim against the board of education 
alleging that her daughter had been the victim of sexual harassment by 
another student in her class.62  The crux of the petitioner’s argument was 
                                                                                                             
DUQ. L. REV. 521 (2008) (treating Morse as simply setting a standard by which a school can 
regulate speech advocating illegal drug use), and Christy L. Young, Constitutional Law—
First Amendment Rights—The First Amendment Does Not Require Public Schools to Tolerate 
Student Speech Reasonably Interpreted as Encouraging Illegal Drug Use, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 371 
(2008) (same), with Martha McCarthy, Anti-Harassment Provisions Revisited:  No Bright-Line 
Rule, 2008 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 225, 225 (2008) (stating that the Morse opinion does not help 
clarify the law surrounding school policies prohibiting harassment, leaving lower courts to 
issue rulings that are inconsistent). 
57 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006).  The statute reads in pertinent part:  “No person in the 
United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”  Id. 
58 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
59 Id. 
60 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2001). 
61 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
62 Id. at 632.  The suit sought both injunctive and monetary damages under Title IX of 
the Education Amendments of 1972.  Id. at 632–33.  This harassment was alleged to have 
occurred over several months and happened under the supervision of three separate 
teachers.  Id. at 633–34.  Petitioner’s daughter (LaShonda) purportedly reported each of 
these incidents to the supervising teacher, but no disciplinary action was taken against the 
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that the school did not take steps to alleviate the harassing situation 
despite repeated reports of incidents to teachers and the principal.63 
The Court held that, in limited circumstances, intentional 
indifference by a school to known acts of harassment amounts to a 
violation of Title IX and justifies a private action for damages.64  In its 
opinion, the Court cited precedent recognizing that Title IX focuses on 
the benefited class and not the perpetrator, an implied private right of 
action under Title IX exists, and money damages are available in such 
suits.65  In determining whether the school district could be held liable, 
                                                                                                             
student.  Id.  LaShonda’s mother also followed up two of the complaints by directly 
contacting the supervising teacher.  Id. at 634.  On the first of these occasions, LaShonda’s 
mother was assured that the school principal (Principal Querry) had been informed of the 
incidents.  Id.  The harassment finally ceased when the student was charged with, and 
pleaded guilty to sexual battery.  Id. at 634.  In addition, it was claimed that LaShonda was 
not the only student to suffer from this student’s sexual conduct, and a group of female 
students led by LaShonda attempted to complain directly to Principal Querry about the 
student’s conduct.  Id. at 635.  This group of students was told simply that “‘If Querry 
wants you, he’ll call you []’”, and their complaints were not communicated to the Principal.  
Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 10, Aurelia D. v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 
(M.D. Ga. 1994) (Civ. A. No. 94-140-4-MAC (WDO)).  LaShonda claimed that due to the 
harassment she was unable to concentrate on her studies and suffered a drop in her 
previously-high grades.  Id.  It was also shown that she had composed a suicide note that 
her father discovered.  Id. 
63 Id.  Petitioner alleged that no disciplinary action whatsoever was taken against the 
student.  Id.  Petitioner even contacted Principal Querry to inquire about what steps the 
school was planning to take against the student.  Id.  Principal Querry simply responded 
that “‘I guess I’ll have to threaten him a little bit harder.’”  Id. (quoting Complaint ¶ 12, 
Aurelia D v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 862 F. Supp. 363 (M.D. Ga. 1994) (Civ. A. No. 94-
140-4-MAC (WDO)).  Neither was any action taken to separate LaShonda from the student, 
and she was only allowed to change seats to get away from the student three months after 
the harassment began.  Id.; see supra, note 34 and accompanying text (for the proposition 
that the incidents were repeatedly reported to LaShonda’s teachers and school 
supervisors). 
64 Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.  These limited circumstances are ones in which the school 
district “exercises substantial control over both the harasser and the context in which the 
known harassment occurr[ed].”  Id. at 645.  The Court further stated that a school will be 
found deliberately indifferent only where its response, or lack thereof, was clearly 
unreasonable under the circumstances then known.  Id. at 648.  The Court also limited 
schools’ responsibility by requiring simply that they “respond to known . . . harassment in 
a manner that is not clearly unreasonable.”  Id. at 649.  Schools were therefore not required 
to proactively work to remedy peer harassment or to ensure that students conform their 
behavior to certain rules.  Id. at 648. 
65 Id. at 639 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 690–92 (1979) (“There would be 
far less reason to infer a private remedy in favor of individual persons if Congress, instead 
of drafting Title IX with an unmistakable focus on the benefited class, had written it simply 
as a ban on discriminatory conduct . . . .”)); Id. at 639 (citing Cannon, 441 U.S. at 691); Id. at 
639–40 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). 
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the Court focused on its misconduct.66  The Court recognized that 
because Title IX had been treated as an exercise of congressional power 
under the Spending Clause, private damages were available only where 
adequate notice exists to the funding recipients that they may be liable 
for the conduct at issue.67  This private right of action echoes previous 
Supreme Court decisions pertaining to the hostile work environment 
standard used in Title VII regulation and jurisprudence and which has 
had the effect of creating a hostile educational environment concept 
under Title IX.68 
To prove a damages claim for student-on-student sexual harassment 
under Title IX, a plaintiff must show that the sexual harassment is 
“severe, pervasive, and so objectively offensive that it can be said to 
deprive the victims of access to the educational opportunities or benefits 
provided by the school.”69  A prima facie case for money damages 
claiming student-on-student harassment under Title IX involves four 
                                                 
66 Id. at 641–42.  The Court cited Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 
274 (1998), for the proposition that the focus in a Title IX action claiming damages for 
sexual harassment was the intentional misconduct of the federal funding recipient and not 
the misconduct of a third party.  Davis, 526 U.S. at 641–42.  Gebser involved a claim seeking 
monetary damages under Title IX for teacher-on-student sexual harassment.  Gebser, 524 
U.S. at 277–79.  In Gebser, the Court rejected the use of agency principles to impute liability 
for a teacher’s misconduct to the school district, and also rejected the use of a negligence 
standard (the school district knew or should have known about the misconduct) to hold the 
school district liable.  Id. at 283. 
67 Davis, 526 U.S. at 640 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287, for the proposition that Title IX is 
of a contractual nature because it is a manifestation of congressional power under the 
Spending Clause, conditioning receipt of federal funds on compliance with the statute; 
citing Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74–75 for the requirement that there must be adequate notice to 
the recipient of federal funds of liability for the conduct at issue before a private damages 
action will be available); see infra Part II.D (discussing congressional power under the 
Spending Clause). 
68 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (clarifying and defining the 
hostile workplace environment standard); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 
(1986) (formulating the hostile workplace environment standard for Title VII challenges); 
see also John E. Matejkovic & David A. Redle, Proceed at Your Own Risk:  The Balance between 
Academic Freedom and Sexual Harassment, 2006 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 295, 309 (2006) (stating that 
sexual harassment in the educational context borrows many of the standards and concepts 
from Title VII); Susan P. Stuart, Jack and Jill Go to Court:  Litigating a Peer Sexual Harassment 
Case Under Title IX, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 243, 253 (2006) (stating that in the Davis 
decision, Justice O’Connor relied on the Title VII test for same-sex sexual harassment that 
the Court had used in a case decided the previous year, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore 
Service, Incorporated, 523 U.S. 75 (1998)); OCR, Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance:  
Harassment of Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, available at 
http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.html (last visited Nov. 12, 
2008) (“[T]he Davis Court also indicated, through its specific references to Title VII caselaw, 
that Title VII remains relevant in determining what constitutes hostile environment sexual 
harassment under Title IX.”). 
69 526 U.S. at 650. 
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elements.70  First, the harassment must be severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive.71  Second, the conduct must deny the victim equal 
access to the school’s educational functions.72  Third, the school district 
must have actual knowledge of the harassment.73  Finally, the school 
district must show deliberate indifference that subjects the victim to the 
sexual harassment at issue.74  After Davis, courts have evaluated anti-
harassment codes designed to protect schools against Title IX liability 
according to the requirements of the First Amendment. 
b. Title IX as an Answer to School Harassment Called into Question 
The most important of these cases is Saxe v. State College Area School 
District, in which the Third Circuit faced a challenge to a public school 
                                                 
70 Stuart, supra note 68, at 251–56.  A prima facie case claiming damages for peer sexual 
harassment under Title IX requires four elements per Davis:  (1) there must be proof of 
actionable harassment:  conduct that is severe, pervasive and objectively offensive; (2) the 
conduct must deny the victim equal access to the federal funding recipient’s educational 
opportunities and resources (the author mentions that the Court relied on Title VII hostile 
workplace environment precedent to determine if this element was met); (3) the school 
district must have “actual knowledge of the peer sexual harassment in an educational 
activity”; (4) deliberate indifference on the part of the school district that subjects the 
student to sexual harassment or makes him or her liable to be subject or vulnerable to it, 
must be shown.  Id. 
71 Id. at 253–54.  Stuart stated that Justice O’Connor relied on a Title VII test for proof of 
a hostile working environment as articulated in Oncale, and that using this “the Court 
determined that actionable conduct could cover circumstances when the school ‘is 
permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently severe 
or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s [educational opportunity] and create an 
abusive [school] environment.’”  Id. at 253 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78) (changes made in 
article).  Also, under this standard, the proof of a hostile environment “‘depends on a 
constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not 
fully captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.’”  
Id. (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82). 
72 Id. at 254 (“[T]he pervasive nature of the harasser’s conduct must be systemic and ‘so 
undermine[] and detract[] from the victims’ educational experience, that the victim-
students are effectively denied equal access to an institution’s resources and 
opportunities.’”) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 651).  According to Stuart, the Court relied on 
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986), and referred to the test used 
therein for the proposition that actionable harassment must simply alter the conditions of 
employment and create an abusive environment.  Id. 
73 Id. at 255 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 644–45).  Deliberate indifference by the school 
district subjects a student to sexual harassment or makes him or her liable to be subject or 
vulnerable to it.  Id.  The school district’s behavior must also be shown to be “clearly 
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances,” and the school district must simply 
respond in a reasonable manner.  Id. at 255–56 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 649). 
74 Id. at 254–55 (stating that direct evidence of sexual harassment as well as reports of 
harassment to teachers and principals seem sufficient to find the school district to have 
actual knowledge). 
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district’s anti-harassment policy.75  The court rejected the school district’s 
claim that the policy covered only speech already restricted under 
federal and state anti-discrimination laws.76  The court also rejected the 
school district’s claim that harassment is not protected activity under the 
First Amendment.77  The court found the policy unconstitutional because 
                                                 
75 240 F.3d 200 (2001).  The challenge was brought by a Pennsylvania State Board of 
Education member on behalf of two students from the school district for whom he was 
legal guardian.  Id. at 203.  The suit alleged that the students feared punishment under the 
policy for expressing their religious beliefs, which compelled them to speak about moral 
issues, including the sinfulness and harmfulness of homosexuality.  Id.  The District Court 
found the policy constitutional because the standard contained in it was similar to those 
used to define Title VII and Title IX harassment.  Id. at 204.  The District Court, as well as 
the Third Circuit, found the operable definition of harassment contained in the policy’s 
second paragraph as follows: 
Harassment means verbal or physical conduct based on one’s actual or 
perceived race, religion, color, national origin, gender, sexual 
orientation, disability, or other personal characteristics, and which has 
the purpose or effect of substantially interfering with a student’s educational 
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment. 
Id. at 202 (emphasis added). 
76 Id. at 210.  The court determined that the prohibition of harassment based on personal 
characteristics was outside the scope of permissible harassment regulation contained in 
Title VI and Title IX.  Id.  The court also found the portion of the policy proscribing 
negative comments about a person’s values struck “at the heart of moral and political 
discourse—the lifeblood of constitutional self government (and democratic education) and 
the core concern of the First Amendment.”  Id.  According to the court, no court or 
legislature has ever even suggested that this type of speech may be prohibited under an 
anti-discrimination policy.  Id.  Also, the policy created liability for speech that has only the 
purpose of harassing another, and no effect is required.  Id.  This focuses on the speaker’s 
intent and allows the policy to cover speech that is merely “simple acts of teasing and 
name-calling”, which the Court in Davis explicitly held to be insufficient to find liability.  
Id. at 210–11 (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 652).  See Kay P. Kindred, When Equal Opportunity 
Meets Freedom of Expression:  Student-on-Student Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment 
in School, 75 N.D. L. REV. 205, 222–23 n.116 (1999) (noting that the majority of Title IX 
hostile environment cases that have reached the courts “have included some physical 
touching or other conduct in addition to harassing speech”). 
77 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 204.  See id. at 207 (stating that the Supreme Court has not to this date 
expressly addressed whether harassment is exempt from First Amendment protection 
when it is in the form of pure speech); see also Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 980 
P.2d 846, 863 (Cal. 1999) (Werdegar, J., concurring) (“No decision by the United States 
Supreme Court has, as yet, declared that the First Amendment permits restrictions on 
speech creating a hostile work environment . . . .”).  But see Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207–09 
(discussing that in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992), the Supreme Court 
“suggested in dictum that at least some harassing speech does not warrant First 
Amendment protection”).  The Saxe court did not accept this to mean that all anti-
discrimination laws are immune from First Amendment challenge when used to prohibit 
speech on the sole basis of the expressive content of the speech.  Id. 
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it was substantially overbroad and likely to envelop or chill 
constitutionally-protected speech.78 
The court found that anti-discrimination policies—when applied to 
harassment claims based on verbal, pictorial, or literary matter—
imposed “content-based, viewpoint discriminatory restrictions on 
speech.”79  This kind of policy is subject to the most exacting First 
Amendment standard:  strict scrutiny.80  The policy cannot be justified by 
recourse to the speech’s secondary effects because the emotive impact of 
speech on the audience it reaches is not considered a secondary effect.81  
                                                 
78 Id. at 217.  “A regulation is unconstitutional on its face on over breadth grounds where 
there is a ‘likelihood that the statute’s very existence will inhibit free expression’ by 
‘inhibiting the speech of third parties who are not before the Court.’”  Id. at 214 (quoting 
Members of City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 799 (1984)).  “To render a 
law unconstitutional, the over breadth must be ‘not only real but substantial in relation to 
the statute’s plainly legitimate sweep.’”  Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 
615 (1973)). 
79 Id. at 206 (quoting DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass’n, 51 F.3d 591, 596–
97 (5th Cir. 1995).  The court noted that disparaging comments directed at another person’s 
sex, race, or other personal characteristic have the potential to create a hostile environment 
and therefore fit within the ambit of anti-discrimination laws because of the subject matter 
and viewpoint expressed.  Id.  See, e.g., Deborah Epstein, Can a “Dumb Ass Woman” Achieve 
Equality in the Workplace?  Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 
GEO. L.J. 399, 433 (1996); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Sexual Harassment, Content Neutrality, and the 
First Amendment Dog that Didn’t Bark, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 8 (all supporting the proposition 
that anti-harassment laws raise the specter of content and viewpoint based discrimination); 
Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47  RUTGERS L. REV. 563, 571–72 
(1995).  But see Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the First Amendment:  Content-Neutral 
Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the “Reasonable Person”, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217 (1998) 
(suggesting that Title VII law is based on content neutral principles). 
80 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207.  After making this statement, the court looked to the opinion in 
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul in which the Supreme Court found that even a prohibition on 
fighting words, which is an unprotected category of speech, is unconstitutional when the 
prohibition discriminated on the basis of content and viewpoint.  Id.  The Court in R.A.V. 
concluded that “[t]he point of the First Amendment is that majority preferences must be 
expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis of its content.”  R.A.V. 
v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).  The Saxe court concluded from this that anti-
harassment laws may pose some of the same problems that the Court found with the 
ordinance in R.A.V.  Saxe, 240 F.3d at 207.  The problem is that the laws may regulate 
speech within a category of deeply offensive or potentially disruptive speech, due at least 
in part to the speech’s subject matter and viewpoint.  Id. 
81 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209 (relying on Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989), for the 
proposition that ideas which society finds offensive or disagreeable are a bedrock principle 
of the First Amendment).  The court recognized that the Supreme Court has “made it 
clear . . . that the government may not prohibit speech under a ‘secondary effects rationale’ 
based solely on the emotive impact that its offensive content may have on a listener.”  Id.  
The court then quoted Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1998) (“The emotive impact of 
speech on its audience is not a ‘secondary effect’”) (internal quotations omitted).  See also 
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 811 (2000) (“The overriding 
justification for the regulation is concern for the effect of the subject matter on 
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Anti-harassment policies have also been employed in other contexts, 
such as Title VII, to avoid liability under congressional statutes that aim 
to deter discrimination and harassment. 
2. Title VII and the Hostile Work Environment 
In the employment setting, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
(“Title VII”) makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against 
an employee because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.82  In the regulations promulgated by the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) to enforce Title VII, the EEOC 
established the concept of a hostile environment arising from harassment 
in the workplace.83  The seminal hostile work environment case, Meritor 
Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, illustrates the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
the hostile work environment concept for purposes of Title VII liability.84  
This decision was further clarified and explained by the Court in Harris 
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.85 
a. The Hostile Workplace Environment as a Framework to Analyze Workplace 
Harassment 
In Meritor, the Supreme Court confronted important questions 
regarding workplace sexual harassment claims under Title VII.86  This 
case involved claims by a female employee about sexual harassment by 
                                                                                                             
[listeners]. . . .  This is the essence of content-based regulation.”); Saxe, 240 F.3d at 209.  See 
generally Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (establishing the concept of 
“secondary effects” as a permissible reason for which government may establish content-
discriminatory speech restrictions so long as the restriction is justified with reference to the 
effects that come with the speech and not the speech itself). 
82 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).  The full text of the applicable portion of the statute 
reads: 
(a)Employer Practices 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise 
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . 
Id. 
83 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2010).  Under this regulation, conduct that “[h]as the purpose 
or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work performance or creating an 
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment” will lead to liability under Title 
VII.  Id. 
84 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
85 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
86 477 U.S. at 57. 
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her male boss.87  The Supreme Court held that a claim of hostile work 
environment sexual harassment under Title VII is actionable.88  The 
Court stated that the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in 
extending absolute liability to employers for sexual harassment by their 
supervisors.89 
While the decision in Meritor was limited to a claim of sexual 
harassment, it established that a claim for harassment or discrimination 
under Title VII may be proven by demonstrating that the harassment or 
                                                 
87 Id. at 60.  Meritor involved a claim of sexual harassment occurring over the course of 
several years.  Id.  Plaintiff Vinson alleged that while she had engaged in sexual intercourse 
forty to fifty times during this period, she felt compelled to do so out of fear of losing her 
job.  Id.  She also claimed that her boss fondled her in front of other employees, followed 
her into the female bathroom, demanded sexual favors both at work and after business 
hours, and exposed himself to her.  Id.  The district court had found that any sexual activity 
was voluntary on Vinson’s part, and that she had not been the victim of sexual harassment 
or discrimination at work.  Id. at 61.  They further concluded that even if the sexual activity 
had not been voluntary, the bank would not be liable because it had not been put on notice 
due to the absence of complaints of sexual harassment against Vinson’s boss.  Id. at 62.  The 
D.C. Circuit court reversed, finding that the question of the voluntariness of Vinson’s 
conduct had no effect on the fact that her boss’s conduct had created a hostile environment, 
as this concept is formulated in the EEOC’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex.  
Id. at 62–63 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) for the proposition that the EEOC had set out 
hostile environment as a type of sexual harassment claim).  The Circuit Court also found 
that the bank would be liable by interpreting Title VII’s definition of employer and the 
guidelines established by the EEOC to mean that an employer is absolutely liable for a 
supervisory employee’s sexual harassment, even without notice.  Id. at 63. 
88 Id. at 73.  The Court quoted the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Henson v. Dundee, 682 
F.2d 897 (1982), in which the court stated that “[s]exual harassment which creates a hostile 
or offensive environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual 
equality at the workplace that racial harassment is to racial equality.”  Id. at 66–67 (quoting 
Henson, 682 F.2d at 903).  The Court also recognized that other courts have applied the 
hostile environment concept to race, see, e.g., Firefighter’s Inst. for Racial Equality v. St. 
Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 515–16 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, sub nom. Banta v. United States, 434 
U.S. 819 (1977); religion, see, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 
1976); and national origin, see, e.g., Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 
87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977). 
89 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.  The Court reasoned that the decision by Congress to define 
“employer” to include an “agent” of the employer sets limits on an employer’s liability for 
the acts of its employees.  Id.  While agreeing with the EEOC that Congress had intended 
common-law agency principles to guide determinations of employer’s liability for the acts 
of its employees, the Court noted that the concepts of common-law agency may not always 
be transferrable for Title VII purposes.  Id.  Because of Congress’s intent to incorporate 
agency principles into Title VII to at least some degree, the Court found that the absence of 
notice to an employer does not necessarily insulate them from liability under Title VII.  Id.  
But the Court noted that the EEOC suggests that for a sexual harassment claim of hostile 
environment under Title VII, actual knowledge is required unless the employee has a 
reasonable avenue available to make his or her complaint known to management officials.  
Id. at 71.  In this case, the Court found Vinson’s failure to initiate a complaint against her 
boss through the established grievance procedure did not necessarily insulate the bank 
from liability, but declined to issue a definitive rule on employer liability.  Id. at 72. 
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discrimination caused the workplace to become a hostile work 
environment.90  In reaching its decision, the Court concluded that for 
harassment to be actionable under a hostile work environment theory, 
the harassment “[m]ust be sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.’”91  In addition, the Court followed the EEOC’s guidelines 
by stating that the existence of harassment must be analyzed by viewing 
the totality of the circumstances.92 
b. The Hostile Workplace Environment Clarified 
The Supreme Court clarified the standard established in Meritor 
seven years later in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.93  In Harris, a female 
employee sued her previous employer claiming that the sexual 
harassment she suffered at work created an “abusive work 
environment” which caused her to quit.94  The Court granted certiorari to 
resolve a circuit split concerning whether a Title VII plaintiff claiming an 
abusive work environment must prove that his or her psychological 
well-being was seriously affected or that he or she suffered an injury.95 
Harris reaffirmed the standard established in Meritor, which the 
Court characterized as being a middle ground between making merely 
offensive conduct actionable, and requiring a tangible psychological 
                                                 
90 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  Title VII is violated when harassment is 
“[s]ufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and 
create an abusive working environment.’” Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67. 
91 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904). 
92 Id. at 69.  The Court stated that the EEOC guidelines made clear that the “[t]rier of fact 
must determine the existence of sexual harassment in light of ‘the record as a whole’ and 
‘the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context 
in which the alleged incidents occurred.’”  Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)). 
93 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
94 Id.  Plaintiff Teresa Harris claimed that her supervisor, Charles Hardy, sexually 
harassed her at work over the course of her employment there.  Id. at 19.  Harris claimed 
that Hardy told her in the presence of other employees, “[Y]ou’re a woman, what do you 
know,” and called her “a dumb ass woman.”  Id.  Harris also claimed that Hardy would 
ask her and other female employees to grab coins out of his front pants pocket, throw coins 
on the floor and ask them to pick them up, and make sexual innuendos about their 
clothing.  Id.  During Harris’s period of employment, Hardy purportedly made several 
other remarks of a sexual nature to Harris in front of other employees.  Id.  After over two 
years of this treatment, Harris quit and sued Forklift Systems, Inc., claiming that Hardy’s 
conduct created an abusive work environment.  Id. 
95 Id. at 20.  The Court cited Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620 (6th Cir. 
1986) (requiring a serious effect on psychological well being) and Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 
872, 877-78 (9th Cir. 1991) (rejecting a requirement of serious effect on psychological well 
being), as examples of the opposing viewpoints the Court was attempting to reconcile.  Id. 
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injury.96  Harris established an objective, reasonable person standard 
which requires the conduct to be so severe or pervasive that a reasonable 
person would find the environment it creates hostile or abusive.97  Also, 
the victim must subjectively perceive the environment created by the 
conduct as hostile or abusive.98  In closing, the Court reaffirmed the 
totality of the circumstances approach put forth in Meritor as the proper 
method to determine whether an environment is hostile or abusive.99  
The Court stated that while the psychological well-being of the plaintiff 
is relevant to whether he or she finds the environment subjectively 
hostile or abusive, no single factor is required.100  In response to Title IX 
liability, and looking to Title VII for guidance, states have begun to enact 
anti-bullying statutes that often center on harassment, a form of 
psychological harm that is perpetuated through expression. 
                                                 
96 Id. at 21.  The Court stated that Title VII is violated prior to the harassing conduct 
producing a nervous breakdown.  Id. at 22.  The Court noted that “[a] discriminatorily 
abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously affect employees’ 
psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees’ job performance, 
discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from advancing in their 
careers.”  Id.  Also, the Court felt that “the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so 
severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees because of 
their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII’s broad rule of workplace 
equality.”  Id.  In addition, the conduct and especially egregious examples of harassment 
found in Meritor did “not mark the boundary of what is actionable.”  Id.  Title VII does not 
require concrete psychological harm and is not limited to conduct that produces such a 
result.  Id.  So long as a workplace environment is found to be hostile or abusive, “there is 
no need for it also to be psychologically injurious.”  Id.  But see Catharine A. MacKinnon, 
Directions in Sexual Harassment Law, 31 NOVA L. REV. 225, 225 (2007) (stating that “the 
abusiveness that hostile workplace environment cases are required to allege to survive 
summary judgment has observably become more extreme, generally speaking”). 
97 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21.  “Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an 
objectively hostile or abusive work environment–an environment that a reasonable person 
would find hostile or abusive–is beyond Title VII’s purview.”  Id.; see Faragher v. City of 
Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 
81 (1998). 
98 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22;  see Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787. 
99 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.  The Court recognized that because of the nature of the inquiry, 
there was not and could not be a mathematically precise test for making this determination.  
Id. at 22. 
100 Id. at 23.  The Court provided a list of factors that may be used to determine if an 
environment is hostile or abusive for purposes of Title VII.  Id.  These factors include:  “the 
frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or 
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee’s work performance.”  Id. 
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C. State Anti-Bullying Legislation 
In response to the problems with bullying in public schools, forty-
one states have adopted anti-bullying legislation as of April 9, 2010.101  
The laws vary in their definitions of bullying and the determination of 
what constitutes bullying is often left to the individual school boards102  
However, nearly all of the statutes have three common elements:103  (1) 
either an identification of who will determine the definition of bullying 
or a definition of bullying itself; (2) ways to report bullying; (3) and the 
consequences for bullying.104  Some go further, requiring schools to 
adopt affirmative measures to prevent bullying.105  The most important 
element addressed by these statutes, for the purposes of this Note, is the 
definition of bullying. 
Definitions of bullying can be characterized in one of two ways.106  
One commentator has proposed five categories by focusing on the 
content of the definition.107  Two other commentators place the 
definitions into three categories based on the definition’s focus to 
determine if the conduct is bullying.108  Because the definition of bullying 
is the most crucial element of an anti-bullying statute and because it is 
the focus of this Note, the approach that focuses on the content of the 
definition is the most important for developing a comprehensive anti-
bullying policy.109 
                                                 
101 Bully Police USA, supra note 4. 
102 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1135–46 (noting five bases of definitions for anti-bullying 
legislation); Susan Hanley Kosse & Robert H. Wright, How Best to Confront the Bully:  Should 
Title IX or Anti-Bullying Statutes be the Answer?, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 53, 62 (2005) 
(noting most anti-bullying laws do not explicitly define bullying, but defer instead to the 
discretion of individual school boards, and that those that do define bullying vary greatly 
as to what conduct is subject to the law).  Kosse and Wright also believe that the problems 
created by these differing standards contribute to the ineffectiveness of state anti-bullying 
statutes.  Kosse & Wright, supra, at 71. 
103 Kosse & Wright, supra note 102, at 62 (stating that nearly all anti-bullying legislation 
as of 2005 have three common elements). 
104 Id. at 62 (stating that while most statutes differ in how they approach the elements, 
nearly all include a definition of bullying or a method for creating one, facilitate the 
reporting of bullying, and enumerate the consequences of bullying).  
105 Id.  See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-109.1 (2008) (requiring schools to adopt “a 
specific policy concerning bullying prevention and education”). 
106 See Kosse & Wright, supra note 102, at 62–63. 
107 Hart, supra note 6, at 1135–46 (proposes that definitions of bullying in anti-bullying 
legislation can be tort-based, based on the Tinker substantial disruption standard, on the 
creation of a hostile environment, on the fighting words doctrine, or on intent to ridicule). 
108 Kosse & Wright, supra note 102, at 62–63 (proposing that most statutes defining 
bullying focus on either the intent of the student who is accused of bullying, the reasonable 
of the student’s actions, or the effect that the conduct has another student). 
109 See supra Part I (setting out the thesis and goals of this Note). 
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The first of these categories includes legislation using a tort-based 
definition of bullying.110  Tort-based definitions can be narrow and often 
include only intentionally tortious conduct such as assault and battery, 
thereby sanctioning only behavior that is already illegal.111  
Alternatively, tort-based definitions can be broad and include written, 
verbal or physical acts, or the threat of a physical act.112 
A second category defines bullying based on the substantial 
disruption standard put forth by the Court in Tinker; for instance, New 
Jersey’s statute focuses on conduct that causes a disruption within the 
school environment.113  While this standard is constitutional because it is 
taken directly from a Supreme Court opinion, very few states have used 
this standard in their anti-bullying statutes.114  Other statutes focus on a 
portion of the Saxe opinion to interpret Tinker as allowing schools to 
prohibit speech which “substantially interfere[s] with a student’s 
educational performance.”115 
                                                 
110 Hart, supra note 6, at 1135–37. 
111 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 20-2-751.4(a) (2008) (providing that bullying means “[a]ny 
willful attempt or threat to inflict injury on another person, when accompanied by an 
apparent present ability to do so; or [a]ny intentional display of force such as would give 
the victim reason to fear or expect immediate bodily harm”); NEV. REV. STAT. § 388.129 
(2006) (defining intimidation as “[a] willful act or course of conduct that is not otherwise 
authorized by law and:  [I]s highly offensive to a reasonable person; and [p]oses a threat of 
immediate harm or actually inflicts harm to another person or to the property of another 
person”). 
112 See, e.g.,  LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(B)(2)(a) (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-
26(a)(2)(i) (2008); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2)(a) (West 2008). 
113 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-14 (West 2008), which includes in its definition of 
harassment, intimidation or bullying, “[a]ny gesture, any written, verbal or physical act, or 
any electronic communication . . . that has the effect of insulting or demeaning any student 
or group of students in such a way as to cause a substantial disruption in, or substantial 
interference with, the orderly operation of the school.”  See also Hart, supra note 6, at 1137; 
supra note 23 and accompanying text (stating the standard established by Tinker). 
114 See, e.g. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2)(b), (d), which includes in its 
definition of harassment, intimidation, and bullying, “intentional electronic, written, 
verbal, or physical act[s] [that] . . . [have] the effect of substantially interfering with a 
student’s education; or . . . [have] the effect of substantially disrupting the orderly 
operation of the school.”  But see Hart, supra note 6, at 1139 (reasoning that the ambiguity of 
the Tinker standard makes its application inconsistent and does not give adequate notice to 
students of what conduct is prohibited). 
115 Hart, supra note 6, at 217 (finding that because a school’s mission is to educate 
students, conduct that interferes with that mission is disruptive to the school environment).  
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2) (2007) (prohibiting “any act that substantially interferes 
with a student’s educational benefits, opportunities or performance”) (emphasis added).  See 
also H.R. 4776(g)(12)(B), (13)(B), 108th Cong. (2004) (including in its definition of both 
bullying and harassment conduct that “adversely affects the ability of a student to 
participate in or benefit from the school’s educational programs or activities”) (this is a bill 
proposed in the House to establish a national bullying and harassment prevention program 
by amending the Safe and Drug Free Schools and Communities Act). 
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A third category defines bullying in terms of a hostile educational 
environment.116  These statutes expand the standard for sexual 
harassment established in Davis to include other forms of discrimination 
and harassment.117 
A fourth category defines bullying based on the “fighting words” 
doctrine and has been adopted in only one state.118  New Hampshire’s 
anti-bullying statute prohibits “[i]nsults, taunts, or challenges, whether 
verbal or physical in nature, which are likely to intimidate or provoke a 
violent or disorderly response.”119  Legislation in this category would 
most likely be analyzed under Tinker with consideration of the Supreme 
Court decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul as well.120   
Finally, a fifth defines bullying based on the intent of the alleged 
bully.121  Legislation in this category employs the broadest definition of 
bullying122 because it focuses on the actor’s mental state and not on the 
effect of the behavior.123  For example, Connecticut’s anti-bullying statute 
defines bullying as “any overt acts by a student or a group of students 
directed against another student with the intent to ridicule, harass, 
humiliate or intimidate the other student.”124 
                                                 
116 Hart, supra note 6 at 1141.  Examples include DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D (2008); 
FLA. STAT. § 1006.147 (2008); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.13(B)(2)(b) ; MD. CODE ANN., 
EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2008); OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2)(c); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 16-21-
26(a)(2)(ii); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28A.300.285(2)(c); H.R. 4776(g)(13)(C), 108th Cong. 
(not expressly providing the hostile environment language, but suggesting this idea). 
117 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999).  See supra Part II.B.1.a 
(discussing Davis, the standard established by it, and the factors for determining if a school 
may be held liable under Title IX). 
118 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3 (2008).  See Hart, supra note 6, at 1144 (stating that New 
Hampshire is the only state to adopt anti-bullying legislation relying on the fighting words 
doctrine). 
119 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193-F:3(II)(a) (this statute requires that a report is to be made 
by any school employee who witnesses such conduct and that the parents of the victim are 
to be notified within forty-eight hours and the decision as to how to remedy the problem is 
left to the discretion of the local school board). 
120 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  In R.A.V. the Court down an ordinance banning hate speech as an 
impermissible content-based restriction of speech by using fighting-words-based-analysis.  
Id.  See also Hart, supra note 6, at 1145 (stating that this legislation would be analyzed under 
Tinker and R.A.V.). 
121 See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d (West 2008); W. VA. CODE § 18-2c-5 (2008). 
122 Hart, supra note 6, at 1145 (stating that the focus on the actor’s mental state makes 
these anti-bullying statutes the most broad and therefore probably violative of the First 
Amendment on over breadth grounds). 
123 Id. 
124 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-222d.  The definition of bullying in this statute requires 
in addition that the bullying take place “on school grounds, at a school-sponsored activity 
or on a school bus,” and that the “acts are committed more than once against any student 
during the school year.”  Id. 
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State anti-bullying statutes are imposed directly by state legislatures.  
The United States Congress has not passed similar legislation, although 
the idea has been raised in Congress.125  One way for Congress to pass 
anti-bullying legislation is to use its power under the Spending Clause to 
condition receipt of federal funds on adopting some type of uniform, 
national anti-bullying or anti-harassment policy. 
D. Congressional Power under the Spending Clause 
Congress is empowered by the Spending Clause to “lay and collect 
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the 
Common Defence and general Welfare of the United States.”126  
Congress may use this power to place conditions on the receipt of federal 
funds.127  Congress has repeatedly exercised this power under the 
Spending Clause to further broad policy objectives by conditioning 
receipt of federal funds on the recipient’s compliance with federal 
statutory and administrative directives.128  Through the Spending 
Clause, objectives that are not actionable through exercise of the 
enumerated legislative powers of the Constitution can be achieved by 
the conditional grant of federal funds.129 
This broad spending power is not unlimited and is subject to several 
general restrictions.130  Congress’s exercise of the Spending Clause power 
can be seen as contractual in nature.131  Thus, the first limitation on 
                                                 
125 H.R. 4776 108th Cong. (2004) (legislation proposed in the House and referred to a 
subcommittee, but never voted on or re-proposed). 
126 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
127 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987); see, e.g., United States v. Am. Library 
Ass’n, Inc., 593 U.S. 194, 203 (2003) (same); Davis v. Monroe County Sch. Bd., 526 U.S. 629, 
654 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 
(1992) (citing to Dole).  See also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 
(1981); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Oklahoma 
v. CSC, 330 U.S. 127 (1947). 
128 Id. (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (opinion of Burger, C.J.)).  
See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 
U.S. 275, 295 (1958); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143–44 (1947); Steward 
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
129 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing to United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936)). 
130 Id.  See, e.g., Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13; Steward, 301 U.S. at 585. 
131 Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17. 
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the 
nature of a contract:  in return for federal funds, the States agree to 
comply with federally imposed conditions.  The legitimacy of 
Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on 
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 
“contract.” 
Id. 
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Congress’s power under the Spending Clause is that Congress must 
exercise the power in pursuit of the “general welfare.”132  The second 
limitation is that if Congress conditions the States’ receipt of federal 
funds, “it ‘must do so unambiguously, . . . enabl[ing] the States to 
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their 
participation.’”133  The next limitation is that conditions on federal funds 
will be found illegitimate if they are not related “‘to the federal interest 
in particular national projects or programs.’”134  There may be an 
independent bar on the conditional grant of federal funds from other 
constitutional provisions.135 
In sum, the Supreme Court has allowed student speech in schools to 
be restricted under three separate standards, also known as the three 
pillars.136  Congress has the power to condition receipt of federal funds 
under the Spending Clause.137  This power could be used to establish a 
national anti-bullying or anti-harassment standard to remedy concerns 
about the scope and effectiveness of state anti-bullying legislation, but 
such a standard would be subject to the limitation of the First 
Amendment.  National legislation would also establish a uniform 
answer to the question of what to do about bullying and harassment in 
schools. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The standards discussed above for regulation of speech have varying 
degrees of scope and effectiveness.  This Note will now analyze those 
standards.  Below, Part III.A begins with a discussion of the effectiveness 
and scope of the Supreme Court standards for regulating student speech 
                                                 
132 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (also stating that in considering whether a particular expenditure 
is in pursuit of the general welfare, substantial deference should be given to the judgment 
of Congress).  See Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 (1937); Butler, 297 U.S. at 65; 
Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Sci., 421 F.3d 342, 348 n.15 (5th Cir. 2005); Benning v. 
Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305 (11th Cir. 2004); Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 318 (4th 
Cir. 2002). 
133 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); Miller, 421 F.3d at 348 n.15; 
Benning, 391 F.3d at 1305; Hodges, 311 F.3d at 318. 
134 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 
(1978) (plurality opinion)).  See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 
(1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions 
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”). 
135 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 
256, 269–70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 
U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)). 
136 Supra Part II.A. 
137 Supra Part II.D. 
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in an anti-bullying statute.138  Part III.B examines the permissible 
regulation of harassing and discriminatory speech under Titles VII and 
IX and their possible application to crafting an effective and 
constitutional anti-bullying statute.139  Part III.C describes the 
effectiveness of state anti-bullying statutes to regulate student speech.140  
Finally, Part III.D analyzes the ability of Congress to condition the 
receipt of federal funds on schools adopting a nationwide student anti-
bullying statute through Congressional Spending power.141 
A. The Effectiveness of Supreme Court Standards for Regulating Student 
Speech in an Anti-Bullying Statute 
1. The Ineffectiveness of Tinker’s Material Disruption Standard 
The ability of Congress to pass an anti-bullying statute that infringes 
expression implicates Tinker and later cases.  While expressly upholding 
Tinker, the Court in Fraser and Kuhlmeier distinguished Tinker.142  Justice 
Black’s dissent suggested that the majority in Tinker did not give schools 
enough power to regulate student speech.143  Justice Black’s concerns 
seem prophetic when viewing the current status of school 
environments.144  This tension is furthered by the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Fraser.145  The Court in Fraser did not employ the substantial 
disruption standard that it had established in Tinker and instead focused 
                                                 
138 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the scope and effectiveness of the Supreme Court’s 
opinions in Tinker and Fraser for the purpose of crafting effective and constitutional student 
speech regulations; the inapplicability of Kuhlmeier to anti-bullying statutes, and finally, the 
impact of R.A.V. and Morse). 
139 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the possible application of Title VII “hostile workplace 
environment” law to the school environment and the partial integration of this standard 
into Title IX’s student-on-student sexual harassment law). 
140 See infra Part III.C (analyzing the effectiveness of the different standards employed by 
state anti-bullying statutes in accomplishing their goal of reducing harassment and 
bullying in public schools). 
141 See infra Part III.D (analyzing the ability of Congress to condition receipt of federal 
funding on schools adopting a comprehensive student anti-bullying statute). 
142 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in Fraser 
distinguished Tinker); supra note 43 and accompanying text (discussing how the Court in 
Kuhlmeier distinguished Tinker). 
143 The record, in Justice Black’s view, “overwhelmingly [showed] that the armbands did 
exactly what the elected school officials and principals foresaw they would, that is, took the 
students’ minds off their classwork and diverted them to thoughts about the highly 
emotional subject of the Vietnam war.”  Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 
U.S. 503, 518 (1969). 
144 See supra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing how Justice Black’s dissent has 
been quoted by a majority of the Court in student speech cases after Tinker). 
145 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
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on the content of the student’s speech.146  The fact that the Court did not 
use the substantial disruption standard in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and more 
recently, Morse, seemingly reduces Tinker’s scope and application.147 
Reinforcing this conclusion is the fact that lower courts have been 
inconsistent in establishing the requirements under Tinker and its impact 
on student speech rights.148  In addition, some lower courts have 
required a physical disturbance to find that student speech constitutes a 
material and substantial disruption.149  This inconsistency shows that as 
applied in lower courts, Tinker is not a uniform standard across the 
nation.150  The ambiguity of Tinker does not give definitive guidance with 
which school officials can craft a speech regulation or feel confident in 
doling out punishment, and other standards established by the Supreme 
Court for student speech regulation are no more effective than Tinker in 
helping schools discipline students for their speech. 
                                                 
146 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (describing the Court’s departure from 
Tinker’s standard in Fraser). 
147 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007); Part II.A.2–3. 
148 See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 540.  For example, the Fifth Circuit treats Tinker as 
simply a case dealing with viewpoint discrimination.  Id.  See Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. 
Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 442 (5th Cir. 2001).  The Tenth Circuit applies Tinker’s substantial 
disruption standard to student speech that is not considered government or school-
sponsored speech.  Mostoller, supra note 39, at 540.  See Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. 
Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Student speech that ‘happens to occur on the 
school premises’ is governed by Tinker . . . .”).  The Seventh Circuit states that the Supreme 
Court has cast some doubt in its decisions following Tinker as to “the extent to which 
students retain free speech rights in the school setting.”  Mostoller, supra note 39, at 543 
(quoting Baxter by Baxter v. Vigo County Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 737 (7th Cir. 1994)).  The 
Third and Ninth Circuits apply Tinker to a catch-all category of student speech not within 
the narrow categories carved out in Fraser and Kuhlmeier.  Mostoller, supra note 39, at 539.  
See Spyniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 254 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(“Defendants do not contend the Foxworthy shirt contained indecent language; nor was 
the shirt school-sponsored.  Accordingly, under Saxe, the shirt is subject to Tinker’s general 
rule. . . .”) (internal quotations omitted); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 989 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“[S]peech that falls into neither [Fraser’s nor Kuhlmeier’s category] is governed 
by Tinker.”).  Additionally, the Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits use more of an ad hoc 
approach to student speech restrictions, allowing a more expansive view of permissible 
speech restrictions.  Mostoller, supra note 39, at 541. 
149 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1139 (stating that emerging from the lower court opinions is 
an “overall impression that the substantial disruption standard requires some likelihood of 
actual, physical disturbance”).  Also, Hart notes that several lower courts have upheld anti-
harassment codes only “where the circumstances surrounding its adoption indicated a high 
likelihood that an identifiable, physical disturbance would result from the prohibited 
speech.”  Id.  Hart also proposes that regulations based on Tinker’s “substantial disruption” 
standard likely cover only physical abuse or speech leading to a confrontation.  Id. 
150 See supra notes 148–49 and accompanying text (discussing some of the different views 
lower courts have taken in interpreting Tinker). 
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2. Fraser and Kuhlmeier’s Ineffectiveness as Standards for Regulating 
Student Speech in an Anti-Bullying Statute and the Impact of 
Subsequent Decisions on Anti-Bullying Legislation 
Kuhlmeier allows schools to regulate speech if the regulation is 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.151  Only speech 
that is or reasonably can be seen as bearing the imprimatur of the school 
is subject to this standard.152  But bullying is almost never speech that 
can be attributed to the school, and therefore Kuhlmeier is not relevant for 
purposes of this Note.153  The Fraser standard, while it has problems, is 
more useful for anti-bullying legislation and will therefore be discussed 
in more detail.154 
The two propositions that the Court promulgated in Fraser are 
neither standards nor tests that can be used to regulate student speech.155  
Reading Fraser as simply recognizing that Tinker is not an exclusive 
standard for student speech, and that students’ constitutional rights are 
not the same as those of adults, does nothing to establish a standard 
under which schools can regulate student speech.156  These propositions 
do not set a definitive standard, nor do they provide guidance to school 
officials as to when student speech may be prohibited or punished.  The 
lack of guidance from Fraser is further evidenced by the conflicting views 
of the Court’s holding by the Circuit Courts.157  The Third and Ninth 
Circuits view Fraser as permitting school regulation of a category of 
lewd, vulgar, obscene, and plainly offensive speech.158  This category of 
                                                 
151 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 258, 273 (1988). 
152 Id. 
153 See supra Part II.A.3 (discussing Kuhlmeier and the narrow scope of its holding). 
154 See infra notes 150–62 and accompanying text (analyzing Fraser’s standard for its 
effectiveness in an anti-bullying statutes). 
155 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 404 (2007). 
156 Id.  The Court recognized that all that could be definitively taken from the Fraser 
decision is that “‘the constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically 
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings[,]’” and that “the mode of analysis set 
forth in Tinker is not absolute.”  Id.  (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675, 682 (1986)). 
157 See e.g., Mostoller, supra note 39, at 539–43.  In an analysis of United States Appellate 
Court application of the student speech standards, Mostoller highlights the different 
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent.  Id. 
158 Id. at 539–40.  See e.g., Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 253 
(3d Cir. 2002) (“‘[T]he determination of what manner of speech . . . is inappropriate 
properly rests with the school board.’  We have interpreted Fraser as establishing that ‘there 
is no First Amendment protection for ‘lewd,’ ‘vulgar,’ ‘indecent,’ and ‘plainly offensive’ 
speech in school.’”) (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683; Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 
F.3d 200, 213 (3d Cir. 2001)); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“‘[T]he determination of what manner of speech in the classroom or in school assembly is 
inappropriate properly rests with the school board,’ rather than with the federal 
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speech is then regulated subject to a reasonableness standard that gives 
deference to the decisions of school officials.159  Other Circuits have taken 
a more expansive approach in interpreting Fraser. 
The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits read Fraser as 
granting more expansive regulatory power to schools in managing 
student speech.160  This interpretation of Fraser leads to an ad hoc 
approach that allows school administrators to regulate speech as 
teachers of “habits and manners of civility.”161  A possible consequence 
of this interpretation is that Fraser allows schools to create a speech code 
that is in effect a general civility code regulating manners and interaction 
among students.162  Adding to this variety in interpretation of Fraser, the 
Fourth Circuit rejects the above approach and interprets Fraser as limited 
to school-sponsored speech as in Kuhlmeier.163 
The ambiguity of Fraser lessens the effect it can have for regulating 
student speech pursuant to an anti-bullying statute.  The fact that the 
Court has questioned the clarity of its own decision and analysis causes 
                                                                                                             
courts[;] . . . vulgar, lewd, obscene and plainly offensive speech is governed by Fraser . . . .” 
(quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 258, 267 (1988)). 
159 See supra note 154 and accompanying text (looking at the Third and Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals’ view of Fraser). 
160 See e.g., Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, Fla., 218 F.3d 1267, 1272 (11th Cir. 2000) 
(“Supreme Court decisions since Tinker indicate that the teaching of civility and the 
inculcation of tradition moral, social, and political norms may override student expression, 
or at least that it is permissible for a school board to so order its educational priorities.”) 
(citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681, 683; Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 271–72)); Lacks v. Ferguson 
Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-2, 147 F.3d 718, 724 (8th Cir. 1998) (“students’ First Amendment 
rights ‘in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society’s countervailing 
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior’” (quoting 
Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)); Muller by Muller v. Jefferson Lighthouse Sch., 98 F.3d 1530, 1536 
(7th Cir. 1996) (“‘Public education must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . .  
It must inculcate the habits and manners of civility[;] . . . [t]hese ‘habits and manners of 
civility’ must ‘take into account consideration of the sensibilities of others, and, in the case 
of a school, the sensibilities of fellow students.’” (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681)); Poling v. 
Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989) (“Local school officials . . . must obviously be 
accorded wide latitude in choosing which pedagogical values to emphasize, and in 
choosing the means through which those values are to be promoted.”). 
161 Fraser, 478 U.S. at 681.  See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 541–42. 
162 Mostoller, supra note 39, at 541–42. 
163 See Crosby v. Holsinger, 852 F.2d 801, 802 (4th Cir. 1988) (reading Fraser along with 
Kuhlmeier to stand for the proposition that “school officials need not sponsor or promote all 
student speech”).  See also Mostoller, supra note 39, at 542 (“This interpretation is contrary 
to the view that school sponsorship is central to the Fraser holding, and that the more 
flexible standard in Fraser and Hazelwood stems from a school’s interest in suppressing 
student expression only when such expression could be perceived as school-endorsed.”); 
Jonathan Pyle, Note, Speech in Public Schools:  Different Context or Different Rights?, 4 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 586, 633 (2002) (“[A]lthough many courts have interpreted Fraser to carve out an 
exception to the Tinker disruption standard for vulgar speech in any context, the Hazelwood 
case clarified Fraser’s holding, confining it to the school-sponsored context.”). 
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further confusion over this opinion and its precedential value.164  Thus, it 
seems schools may regulate lewd or vulgar speech under Fraser, but the 
questionable scope of this general rule and its inherent vagueness gives 
no guidance to school officials and opens regulations to challenges under 
the void for vagueness standard.165  Additionally, the lack of clear factors 
and reasoning in Fraser make it hard to discern how to regulate bullying 
without overbreadth problems.166  Lower federal courts have done 
nothing to crystallize Fraser’s holding and have only added to the 
divergent, conflicting interpretations of the opinion.167 
Two later cases have possible impact on to the ability to effectively 
craft anti-bullying statutes.168  First, R.A.V. seems to disallow any 
regulation of expression that is content-based.169  That the Supreme 
Court did not look to R.A.V. in either Davis or Morse suggests that either 
the Court does not deem R.A.V. applicable to the school setting or that 
R.A.V.’s precedential value is minimal in that context.170  Morse can be 
and has been interpreted as creating a standard by which a school can 
prohibit only expression that advocates illegal drug use.171  Because 
bullying behavior is not advocacy of illegal drug use, Morse is not useful 
for crafting an anti-bullying statute. 
In sum, the standards for permissible regulation of student speech 
established by the Supreme Court have inherent problems preventing 
them from being fully and clearly applicable to student bullying 
                                                 
164 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 404 (stating that the mode of analysis employed in Fraser is not 
entirely clear). 
165 Snook, supra note 27, at 672 (noting that a regulation based on the Fraser standard may 
be found “unconstitutional if it is written in such vague terms as to not adequately give 
students notice of speech that is prohibited”). 
166 See id. at 673 (stating that a regulation based on Fraser “could lend itself to a 
substantial number of impermissible applications;  . . . the regulation may deter protected 
expression, and school officials would have to enforce it in a way that avoids such 
unconstitutional application”). 
167 See supra notes 154–60 and accompanying text (looking at the Circuit Courts’ differing 
views of Fraser’s holding). 
168 See supra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (discussing the possible ramifications of 
R.A.V. for anti-bullying legislation and the possible new standard arising in Morse). 
169 See supra note 50 and accompanying text (setting out the requirement of content-
neutrality set by R.A.V.). 
170 See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Davis, which does not cite R.A.V.); supra notes 53–56 
(discussing Morse, the Court’s latest student speech case, which also does not cite R.A.V. a 
single time). 
171 See supra note 56 and accompanying text (stating that while the true impact of Morse 
on student speech rights is unclear at this time, many commentators conclude it creates a 
narrow standard allowing for regulation of student expression advocating illegal drug use; 
citing two of many articles articulating this point). 
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regulations.172  The opinions provide abundant, oft-quoted language that 
can justify certain speech codes or regulations.173  However, there is 
significant ambiguity in Tinker and Fraser, and many questions 
pertaining to their import and scope as applied to student speech.174 
B. The Effectiveness of Congressional Regulations on Harassing or 
Discriminatory Speech 
1. Effectiveness of Title IX for Regulating Student Speech 
Title IX prohibits discrimination based on sex in any educational 
program or activity that receives federal funding.175  The Supreme 
Court’s decision in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education established 
a private right of action for victims of student-on-student sexual 
harassment under Title IX.176  This decision has motivated schools to take 
affirmative steps to prevent student-on-student sexual harassment.177  
In Davis, the Supreme Court cited examples of conduct that would 
not give rise to liability under Title IX.178  These examples illustrate the 
high burden of proof required to prove a claim of student-on-student 
sexual harassment.179  In addition, it has proven difficult to meet the 
“severe and pervasive” standard established in Fraser.180  The Court 
further limited its holding by distinguishing Title IX law from Title VII 
law because of the difference in the age and maturity of the protected 
                                                 
172 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the efficacy of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Tinker, 
Fraser, and Kuhlmeier for regulating student speech in an anti-bullying statute). 
173 See supra Part II.A (setting out and discussing the “three pillars” of Supreme Court 
student speech jurisprudence:  Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier, and the major standards they 
established). 
174 See supra Parts III.A.1–2 (discussing the effectiveness and problems of using Tinker and 
Fraser as standards for regulating student speech through an anti-bullying statute). 
175 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006). 
176 See supra Part II.B.1.a (discussing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 
(1999)). 
177 See e.g., Matejkovic, supra note 68, at 305–06 (“Courts have regularly held that Title IX 
imposes duties on educational institutions to prevent sexual harassment of students in the 
same fashion that Title VII imposes duties on employers to prevent sexual harassment of 
employees.”). 
178 Davis, 526 U.S. at 652.  The Court took for granted that “students often engage in 
insults, banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to 
the students subjected to it.”  Id. at 651–52.  The Court next stated that “[d]amages are not 
available for simple acts of teasing and name-calling among school children, however, even 
where these comments target differences in gender.”  Id. at 652.  Thus, the Court decided 
that these acts would not give rise to a Title IX action.  Mostoller, supra note 39, at 545–46. 
179 See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 545–46. 
180 See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 547 (noting that “lower courts have required relatively 
extreme behavior to satisfy the severe and pervasive standard”). 
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classes, lessening the scope of its opinion and raising questions as to the 
viability of the standard for older students.181 
The Sixth and Tenth Circuits addressed extreme and egregious 
conduct in school by finding peer sexual harassment actionable under 
Title IX.182  Federal district courts have not considered verbal harassment 
alone as satisfying Davis’s severe and pervasive standard.183  Therefore, 
extreme and egregious behavior is required to trigger a violation of Title 
IX.184  In Saxe, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals restricted the ability of 
schools to limit their own liability under Title IX by applying the First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine to a school anti-harassment policy.185 
While these limitations lessen schools’ potential liability under Title 
IX, regulations promulgated under Title IX can be used to fashion a 
student anti-bullying statute because Title IX has been tested before the 
Court.186  However, because verbal harassment alone does not trigger 
liability, schools likely will not be motivated to restrict student speech 
that is viewed as simply teasing, even though it is often the most 
damaging verbal harassment.  The Court has also pointed out that, while 
Title IX law has been fashioned with an eye to Title VII, the difference in 
age and maturity of the protected classes affords less protection to 
students.187  Thus, Title IX law does not reach all the types of bullying 
that are harmful to young children and that can lead to physical 
confrontation.188  Additionally, the relationship between Title IX law on 
                                                 
181 Davis, 526 U.S. at 651–52.  The Court stated that courts “must bear in mind that 
schools are unlike the adult workplace and that children may regularly interact in a 
manner that would be unacceptable among adults.”  Id. at 651.  The Court also observed 
that “at least early on, students are still learning how to interact appropriately with their 
peers.  It is thus understandable that, in the school setting, students often engage in insults, 
banter, teasing, shoving, pushing, and gender-specific conduct that is upsetting to the 
students subjected to it.”  Id. at 651–52. 
182 Mostoller, supra note 39, at 547. 
183 Hart, supra note 6, at 1143 (noting that “lower courts interpreting the Davis standard 
have so far required physical conduct to hold schools liable under Davis; in some cases, 
they have dismissed claims because they involved only verbal abuse”); Mostoller, supra 
note 39, at 547–48. 
184 See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 548 (stating that “lower courts have interpreted the 
severe and pervasive standard to require extreme behavior that must include some 
physical conduct beyond verbal harassment”). 
185 Id. at 217. 
186 See supra notes 107–09 (introducing the category of state anti-bullying statutes that 
employ the hostile environment standard, established by the Supreme Court in Davis, as 
the standard for analyzing Title IX claims). 
187 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1143 (stating that “the Davis standard gives children less legal 
protection in school than adults receive in the workplace under Title VII,” and that the 
Court has acknowledged and accepted this fact). 
188 See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text (discussing types of bullying other than 
physical abuse that can lead to violence and psychological damage). 
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sexual harassment and First Amendment freedom of speech remains 
unclear.189  Therefore, the extent to which sexually harassing speech can 
be regulated under the First Amendment is unclear.  But at least it can be 
said that sexually harassing speech can be prohibited in schools to 
protect students, which is all that is required for the purpose of crafting 
an anti-bullying statute.  Standards for other types of harassing speech 
may also be effective in prohibiting bullying in schools. 
2. The Possible Applicability of Title VII Standards to the School 
Setting 
The Supreme Court based part of its opinion in Davis on previous 
decisions about the workplace context under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.190  In addition, the Court invoked Title VII precedent in 
formulating its test for Title IX liability.191  At the same time, the Davis 
Court expressly stated that speech and conduct actionable under Title 
VII when performed by adults would not be actionable under Title IX if 
performed by children.192  Therefore, the Supreme Court has indicated 
that children who are being bullied in school have less protection under 
Title IX than adults who are harassed in the workplace under Title VII.193 
Title VII law has been used as guidance by the Court in fashioning 
its Title IX jurisprudence and has been used by the Office of Civil Rights 
to provide guidance to schools complying with Title IX.194  This concept 
                                                 
189  See Mostoller, supra note 39, at 556–59.  There are three possibilities Mostoller 
describes: 
(A) there is a discrete point at which First Amendment protections end 
and impermissible harassment begins; (B) there is a gap between the 
two standards where school officials may suppress speech that falls 
short of harassment and still avoid liability for First Amendment 
violations; or (C) the two standards overlap, leaving schools helpless to 
regulate expression that is both protected by the First Amendment and 
triggers liability under Title IX. 
Id. at 556–57 (the author believes that choice (B) is the proper state of the law at this time 
and that the gap between the two standards might be quite wide judging from precedent). 
190  See Stuart, supra note 68, at 253 (stating that in Davis, the Court looked to Title VII law 
in developing the hostile education environment and that the Department of education did 
the same when crafting regulations under Title IX); Matejkovic, supra note 68, at 309 (same). 
191 See Stuart, supra note 68, at 253–54.  See also Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv. Inc., 
523 U.S. 75 (1998) (dealing  with a Title VII claim; this case was decided the year before 
Davis and Justice O’Connor quoted and cited liberally to it in her majority opinion in 
Davis). 
192 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651–52 (1999). 
193 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1143. 
194 See Stuart, supra note 68, at 254 (“Clearly, Justice O’Connor relied on Title VII’s hostile 
work environment test in establishing whether a student has been discriminated against in 
her access to the educational program.”).  See also Matejkovic, supra note 68, at 309 (stating 
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goes beyond Title IX regulation in prohibiting harassment or 
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.195 
Title VII has at least two distinct advantages over Title IX in the 
context of student speech regulation.  First, Title VII’s hostile workplace 
environment regulation is not limited to discrimination or harassment 
based on sex.196  Second, Title VII has a well-established, thorough, and 
constitutional framework and regulatory system already in place.197  The 
standard of proof is still high, but this has not discouraged the 
promulgation of an entire regulatory scheme.198  Although the Court 
would have to revise part of the precedent set in Davis, Title VII and the 
regulations promulgated under it by the EEOC could be used to fashion 
a student anti-bullying statute that would reach much of the speech 
associated with bullying.  Such a statute would give students the same 
protection against harassment and discrimination that adults enjoy in the 
workplace, and would reach bullying that is not merely sexual in nature. 
C. The Effectiveness of State Anti-Bullying Legislation 
State Anti-Bullying legislation, created as a bulwark against Title IX 
liability and the ongoing problem of bullying, offers different definitions 
of “bullying” and has varying levels of effectiveness.199  The first 
category as described above includes legislation employing a tort-based 
definition of bullying.200  While this legislation may be constitutional, it 
does not reach verbal and psychological bullying and therefore 
implicates only a small percentage of bullying incidents.201 
                                                                                                             
that concepts and standards from Title VII jurisprudence have been borrowed to provide 
proof of sexual harassment or discrimination in the school environment under Title IX); 
DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE:  
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 70 
(2001), http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf (“[T]he Davis 
Court also indicated, through its specific references to Title VII caselaw, that Title VII 
remains relevant in determining what constitutes hostile environment sexual harassment 
under Title IX.”). 
195 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
196 See supra note 72 and accompanying text (setting out the different types of 
discrimination that Title VII prohibits). 
197 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing Title VII law and introducing the EEOC Guidelines as 
adopted by the Supreme Court in its decisions). 
198 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (defining the specific standard set by the 
Court in Meritor for establishing a prima facie claim under Title VII). 
199 See supra Part II.C (discussing the various approaches different states have taken in 
fashioning anti-bullying legislation). 
200 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1137; supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text (introducing 
state anti-bullying statutes that use a tort-based definition of bullying). 
201 Hart, supra note 6, at 1136–37. 
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The second category contains definitions based on the substantial 
disruption standard proffered by Tinker.202  While this standard is 
constitutional because it is taken directly from Tinker, few states use this 
standard in their anti-bullying statutes.203  The effectiveness of this 
definition for anti-bullying statutes is diminished by the uncertainty over 
the continued viability, scope, and application of Tinker’s substantial 
disruption standard.204  Tinker’s standard is also ineffective in preventing 
much of the bullying that occurs in school without a prior history or the 
likelihood of an actual, physical disturbance.205  Other statutes have 
seized on a portion of the Saxe opinion to interpret Tinker as allowing 
schools to prohibit speech that “substantially interfere[s] with a student’s 
educational performance.”206  This is an improvement on definitions 
                                                 
202 Id. at 1137.  See supra notes 104–06 and accompanying text (introducing anti-bullying 
statutes that employ a definition of bullying based on Tinker). 
203 See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the Tinker opinion and standard).  But see Hart, supra 
note 6, at 1139 (reasoning that the ambiguity surrounding the Tinker standard makes its 
application inconsistent and does not give adequate notice to students of what conduct is 
prohibited). 
204 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 417–18 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(Justice Thomas concurs in the opinion because he feels it “creates another exception [to 
Tinker and] [i]n doing so, we continue to distance ourselves from Tinker”).  He also states 
that Morse “erodes Tinker’s hold in the realm of student speech, even though it does so by 
adding to the patchwork of exceptions to the Tinker standard.  I think the better approach is 
to dispense with Tinker altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.”  Id. at 422.  
See, e.g., Guiles ex rel. Guiles v. Marineau, 461 F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that it is 
not clear whether Tinker applies to all non-school sponsored student speech, only political 
speech, or only political viewpoint-based discrimination, “[n]or is Tinker entirely clear as to 
what constitutes ‘substantial disorder’ or ‘substantial disruption’ of or ‘material 
interference’ with school activities” (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Comm. Sch. Dist., 
393 U.S. 503, 513–14 (1969))); Strossen, supra note 22, at 458–59, (“Unfortunately, Tinker was 
in many ways a high-water mark for students’ rights, and we have seen some sad back-
sliding in Supreme Court decisions about students’ rights since then . . . the Supreme Court 
has tended to look less favorably on constitutional rights and civil liberties.”). 
205 Hart, supra note 6, at 1139 (pointing out that lower courts have often required an anti-
harassment code to be accompanied by “a high likelihood that an identifiable, physical 
disturbance would result from the prohibited speech”).  See Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. 
Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 212 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing West v. Derby Unified Sch. Dist. No. 260, 206 
F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000) in support of the proposition that, under Tinker, “if a school can 
point to a well-founded expectation of disruption—especially one based on past incidents 
arising out of similar speech—the restriction [on student speech] may pass constitutional 
muster”). 
206 Saxe, 240 F.3d at 217 (finding that because a school’s mission is to educate students, 
conduct that interferes with that mission is disruptive to the school environment).  See, e.g., 
OR. REV. STAT. § 339.351(2) (2007) (prohibiting any act that “[s]ubstantially interferes with a 
student’s educational benefits, opportunities or performance”) (emphasis added).  See also 
H.R. 4776, 108th Cong. (2004) (bill proposed in the House to establish a national bullying 
and harassment prevention program by amending the Safe and Drug Free Schools and 
Communities Act).  The bill included in its definition of both bullying and harassment 
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employing the Tinker standard, but it is not wholly adequate to curtail 
bullying in schools. 
The third category of anti-bullying legislation includes statutes that 
attempt to define bullying in terms of a hostile educational 
environment.207  These statutes expand the standard established in Davis 
for sexual harassment to include other forms of discrimination and 
harassment.208  Saxe gives reason to doubt whether anti-bullying statutes 
using the hostile or abusive educational environment definition can 
withstand judicial scrutiny.209  Also, lower courts’ treatment of Davis 
indicates that verbal abuse alone is not enough without some physical 
conduct.210 
The fourth category of legislation bases its definition of bullying on 
the fighting words doctrine.211  Because this standard focuses on the 
effects that words have on their listeners, it would most likely be found 
unconstitutional under R.A.V. because the emotive impact on listeners is 
outside the scope of the fighting words doctrine.212  In addition, appellate 
courts have typically required a finding of physical disruption in 
addition to mere offense to words before the Tinker standard can be 
met.213  By the time the “fighting words” doctrine or Tinker come into 
play due to substantial, often physical disruption, this sort of legislation 
has already failed to curtail bullying.214 
                                                                                                             
conduct that “adversely affects the ability of a student to participate in or benefit from the 
school’s educational programs or activities.”  Id. 
207 Hart, supra note 6, at 1141.  See also supra note 107–09 and accompanying text 
(describing hostile educational environment based anti-bullying legislation). 
208 Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
209 See supra Part II.B.1.b. 
210 Mostoller, supra note 39, at 547 (stating that of the Federal District Courts that had 
examined the severe and pervasive standard of Davis, none had at that point found verbal 
harassment alone to be enough to satisfy the standard).  See generally Doe v. Dallas Ind. Sch. 
Dist., 2002 WL 1592694 (N.D. Tex. 2002); Johnson v. Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 47, 194 F. Supp. 2d 
939 (D. Minn. 2002); Burwell v. Pekin Cmty. High Sch. Dist. 303, 213 F. Supp. 2d 917 (C.D. 
Ill. 2002); Benjamin v. Metro. Sch. Dist. of Lawrence Township, 2002 WL 977661 (S.D. Ind. 
2002); Wilson v. Beaumont Ind. Sch. Dist., 144 F. Supp. 2d 690 (E.D. Tex. 2001); Manfredi v. 
Mount Vernon Bd. of Ed., 94 F. Supp. 2d 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Kindred, supra note 76 (noting 
that the majority of Title IX hostile environment cases that have been before the courts 
“have included some physical touching or other conduct in addition to harassing speech”). 
211 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1145–46; supra notes 110–12 and accompanying text 
(introducing anti-bullying legislation that uses a fighting-words-based definition of 
bullying). 
212 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391–94 (1992). 
213 See supra notes 142–43 (discussing the different views lower Federal courts have as to 
what is required to meet the Tinker standard). 
214 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1145 (stating that the “limit [to words that cause more than 
psychological or emotive impact] likely precludes use of the fighting words doctrine as a 
vehicle for any meaningful restriction of harassing or abusive speech”). 
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The fifth category includes legislation with intent-based definitions 
of bullying.215  While these definitions would be very successful in 
identifying bullying, they also would likely be found unconstitutional.216  
In addition, because the focus is on the speaker’s intent, it would be hard 
to demonstrate a substantial disruption or violation of another standard 
because the effect on the listener is not considered.217  Unfortunately, 
these anti-bullying statutes reach the most verbal and psychological 
bullying.218 
Thus, the effectiveness and constitutionality of state anti-bullying 
legislation have not been evaluated, but are problematic, as the 
preceding section explained.219  That this legislation has been introduced 
and passed is a good sign that the problem of bullying is recognized and 
that attempts are being made to remedy it.  Also, certain elements of 
some of these statutes could be used in fashioning a national standard.220  
Congress could use its power under the Spending Clause to enact anti-
bullying legislation and set a national standard to prevent bullying in 
schools. 
D. Congressional Spending Clause Power Used to Remedy the Differing 
Standards 
The Spending Clause allows Congress broad power to accomplish 
objectives that are not within its enumerated legislative powers, by 
conditioning receipt of federal funds on adoption of Congressional 
legislation.221  The Supreme Court views exercise of this power as 
contractual in nature.222  A national student anti-bullying statute enacted 
through Congressional spending power would need to comply with 
these limitations imposed by the Constitution and Supreme Court 
decisions.223 
                                                 
215 See id. at 1145–46; supra notes 113–15 and accompanying text (introducing anti-
bullying statutes that use an intent-based definition of bullying). 
216 See Hart, supra note 6, at 1145–46. 
217 Id. at 1146. 
218 Id. 
219 See id. (“constitutional antibullying and antiharassment statutes are largely ineffective 
in dealing with the verbal and psychological bullying that can lead to more deadly school 
violence”). 
220 See infra Part IV.B (proposing a model statute containing some of these elements). 
221 See Part II.D (discussing Congressional power under the Spending Clause generally). 
222 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). 
223 See supra notes 120–23 (discussing generally the limitations on Congressional 
Spending Clause power). 
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The first requirement, that the spending power must be exercised in 
pursuit of the “general welfare,” would be met by such legislation.224  
Attempting to prevent bullying and harassment of school children is 
within the category of the “general welfare.”  The second limitation, 
requiring Congress to exercise its power unambiguously and give clear 
notice and a voluntary choice to the States, would also be met.225  A clear 
mandate that States must institute an anti-bullying statute crafted by 
Congress upon receipt of federal funds, would certainly be 
unambiguous and give clear notice.  If a uniform anti-bullying statute is 
proposed and passed by Congress, the States would have adequate 
notice of the policy they are accepting.  The third limitation requires that 
the conditions imposed are related to federal interest in a national project 
or program; this too would be satisfied.226  Providing a safe and effective 
learning environment in schools and educational programs is one of the 
utmost federal interests as schools prepare children to be good and 
productive citizens and reach their full potential.227 
The final limitation is that there may be an independent 
constitutional bar on the conditional grant of federal funds.228  This 
limitation would be the most problematic and potentially fatal to a 
national anti-bullying statute because such a statute would involve 
restricting free speech rights in schools and would directly confront the 
First Amendment.  The Supreme Court could possibly find that the 
condition created by national anti-bullying legislation is unconstitutional 
because it violates the First Amendment by prohibiting students’ 
constitutionally-protected speech.  To avoid this result, the Supreme 
                                                 
224 See e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (stating that in considering 
whether a particular expenditure is in pursuit of the general welfare, substantial deference 
should be given to the judgment of Congress); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640–41 
(1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936); Miller v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health 
Sciences, 421 F.3d 342, 348 n.15 (5th Cir. 2005); Benning v. Georgia, 391 F.3d 1299, 1305 
(11th Cir. 2004); Hodges v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 2002) (all affirming that 
the Spending power must be exercised in pursuit of the “general welfare”). 
225 Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17); Miller, 421 F.3d at 348 n.15; 
Benning, 391 F.3d at 1305; Hodges, 311 F.3d at 318.  If Congress conditions States’ receipt of 
federal funds, “it ‘must do so unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the States to exercise their 
choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”  Dole, 483 U.S. at 
207 (quoting Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17). 
226 See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 
(1978) (plurality opinion).  See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 
(1958) (“[T]he Federal Government may establish and impose reasonable conditions 
relevant to federal interest in the project and to the over-all objectives thereof.”). 
227 See e.g. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986). 
228 Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (citing to Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 
U.S. 256, 269–70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 91 (1976) (per curiam); King v. Smith, 
392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34 (1968)). 
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Court would need to be more flexible with its First Amendment 
jurisprudence to provide greater protection to students in schools.  The 
education of America’s youth is extremely important to the future of this 
country and the next generation of Americans. 
IV.  AN ANSWER TO BULLYING IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
Despite continued worries about bullying and its consequences in 
U.S. public schools, some states still do not have any form of anti-
bullying legislation in place.229  The effectiveness of current state anti-
bullying legislation is uncertain but could be greatly enhanced.230  This 
Part will discuss the advantages in reducing bullying and its effects that 
a national statute could provide.  A model anti-bullying statute based on 
existing state anti-bullying statutes and Supreme Court precedent will be 
suggested and discussed.  The model anti-bullying statute proposed in 
this Part results from compiling sections of current state anti-bullying 
legislation and then enhances these sections to effectively accomplish the 
aims of anti-bullying legislation in a constitutional manner.  A national 
anti-bullying statute would provide advantages unavailable through the 
myriad of state statutes that are currently in force. 
A. Advantages of a Single, National Standard for Anti-Bullying Legislation 
A national anti-bullying statute could be tested a single time in front 
of the nation’s courts.  This eliminates the need for continual challenges 
to student anti-bullying statutes and anti-bullying legislation and for 
federal courts to interpret the scope and effect of Supreme Court 
precedent.  In trying to protect their students from bullying and its 
effects, schools have struggled to determine what speech and expression 
they may constitutionally prohibit.  A national standard, once challenged 
and tested in front of the courts, would provide a definitive answer to 
this problem.  The uniform national standard would also increase the 
effectiveness of enforcement because all schools would adhere to the 
same definitions of bullying, prohibited speech and conduct. 
In order to accomplish these aims, Congress should condition 
disbursement of federal education funds on acceptance of this national 
anti-bullying statute, similar to what Congress has already done with 
Title IX.231  This will cause schools and school districts across the nation 
                                                 
229 See supra Part II.D (introducing the different forms state anti-bullying legislation has 
taken and acknowledging that fourteen states still have no anti-bullying legislation). 
230 See supra Part III.C (discussing the effectiveness of current state anti-bullying 
legislation in reducing bullying and its negative effects in schools). 
231 See supra Part II.B (discussing Title IX law). 
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to adopt this anti-bullying code.  An anti-bullying statute passed 
pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause power is contractual in nature 
and requires Congress to speak with a clear voice.232  These requirements 
would be satisfied by the type of legislation proposed in this Note. 
B. Components of an Effective and Constitutional Anti-Bullying Statute 
An effective anti-bullying statute must include the substantial, 
material disruption standard established in Tinker.233  This standard is 
likely constitutional due to its creation and repeated affirmation by the 
Supreme Court.234  The Tinker standard allows anti-bullying statutes to 
encompass disruptive behavior targeted at a student but which may not 
be prohibited by the other standards set out in this Part.235  The other two 
major Supreme Court student speech cases, Fraser and Kuhlmeier, are not 
really applicable to anti-bullying statutes because Fraser’s standard is 
unclear and Kuhlmeier’s deals with school-sponsored speech.236  Title IX 
offers an existing framework and regulatory scheme for proscribing 
harassment based on sex in public schools and has passed the Supreme 
Court’s First Amendment requirements.  This legislative prohibition of 
harassment is important as it allows bullying or harassment based on sex 
to be prohibited by the legislation this Note proposes.  In addition, the 
hostile environment jurisprudence and hostile workplace environment 
standard that Title IX adopts from Title VII law are helpful in crafting a 
comprehensive anti-bullying statute.237 By analogizing Title VII 
workplace jurisprudence to the school environment, Title VII’s 
prohibitions against discrimination based on race, color, religion, and 
national origin can be used to protect students against bullying based on 
these factors.238 
In addition, because of the fragile psyches of adolescents and 
children, other characteristics of these individuals, such as physical 
attributes or socioeconomic status, should be included to make the 
                                                 
232 See supra Part II.D (discussing the nature of legislation passed by Congress pursuant 
to its Spending Clause power). 
233 See supra Part II.A.1 (examining the facts and reasoning of Tinker and the precedents it 
established, including the substantial, material disruption standard). 
234 See supra Part II.A.1–3 (discussing Tinker, Fraser, and Kuhlmeier and recognizing that 
the Supreme Court reaffirmed Tinker’s substantial, material disruption standard in both 
Fraser and Kuhlmeier). 
235 See infra Part IV.C (proposing a model anti-bullying statute). 
236 See supra Part III.A.2 (analyzing the effectiveness of Fraser and Kuhlmeier as standards 
for prohibiting speech through an anti-bullying statute). 
237 See supra Part II.B–C (discussing the Title IX and Title VII hostile environment 
standard). 
238 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006). 
Speraw: No Bullying Allowed:  A Call for a National Anti-Bullying Statute
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
1192 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
statute truly effective.  While no Supreme Court precedent or federal 
statutory provision includes these other characteristics, many state anti-
bullying statutes do include these characteristics.  For these 
characteristics to be included constitutionally in a federal statute, the 
courts, particularly the Supreme Court, would need to recognize and 
allow for the peculiar and special circumstances in and around the 
school environment.  To avoid the over breadth and vagueness problems 
that invalidate much legislation when First Amendment challenges are 
brought, these characteristics must be specifically included.  Also, 
Spending Clause legislation must be precise to give states clear notice so 
that they may knowingly exercise their choice to adopt it. 
C. Model Federal Anti-Bullying Statute 
This Model Statute borrows the best portions from the most 
strongly-drafted state anti-bullying legislation.  To start, anti-bullying 
legislation should give a clear purpose statement with strong legislative 
findings, as New Jersey’s anti-bullying statute does.  Next, the bullying 
and harassment to be prohibited by the statute needs to be clearly and 
unambiguously defined.  Maryland’s anti-bullying statute does this 
thoroughly and concisely.  The applicability of the statute to school 
activities must also be stated.  Delaware’s anti-bullying statute does this 
well  
Also, legislation should provide for a robust system for reporting 
incidents of bullying and providing immunity to the person reporting an 
incident.  Maryland’s statute provides for a detailed and comprehensive 
reporting system.  Florida’s statute sets out an immunity provision in a 
clear, concise manner.  The policy should include a requirement that 
anti-bullying training and education be provided to both students and 
school staff; West Virginia’s statute does this particularly well.  Finally, 
legislation should include a process for handling bullying incidents, as 
does Florida’s  statute.   
This Note’s proposed Model Statute follows:239 
(A) The Legislature Congress finds and declares that:  a 
safe and civil environment in school is necessary for 
students to learn and achieve high academic 
standards; harassment, intimidation or bullying, like 
other disruptive or violent behaviors, is conduct that 
disrupts both a student’s ability to learn and a 
                                                 
239 This proposed statute is composed of language drawn from various state anti-
bullying statutes; this unique compilation is the contribution of the author.  Additions to 
language found in state statutes are italicized. 
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school’s ability to educate its students in a safe 
environment, free from fear and potential violence; and 
since students learn by example, school 
administrators, faculty, staff, and volunteers should 
be commended for demonstrating appropriate 
behavior, treating others with civility and respect, 
and refusing to tolerate harassment, intimidation or 
bullying.240 
(B) “Bullying, harassment, or intimidation” means 
intentional conduct, including verbal, physical, or 
written conduct, or an intentional electronic 
communication, that: 
(1) Creates a hostile educational environment by 
substantially interfering with a student's 
educational benefits, opportunities, or 
performance, or with a student’s physical or 
psychological well-being and is: 
a. Motivated by an actual or a perceived personal 
characteristic including race, national origin, marital 
status, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
religion, ancestry, physical attribute, socioeconomic 
status, familial status, or physical or mental ability 
or disability; or 
b. Threatening or seriously intimidating; 
(ii) 1. Occurs on school property, at a school activity 
or event, or on a school bus; or 
2. Or Ssubstantially disrupts the orderly operation 
of a school.241 
(C) A statement prohibiting bullying Bullying, 
harassment, or intimidation of any person on school 
property or at school functions or by use of data or 
computer software that is accessed through a 
computer, computer system, computer network or 
other electronic technology of a school district or 
charter school from kindergarten through grade 12 
shall be prohibited by this statute.242 
(D) The State Department of Education shall require a 
county board or other school administrative body to 
report incidents of bullying, harassment, or 
                                                 
240 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:37-13 (West 2008). 
241 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424.1 (West 2008). 
242 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4112D(b)(2)(a) (2008). 
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intimidation against students attending a public 
school under the jurisdiction: 
(1) An incident of bullying, harassment, or 
intimidation may be reported openly or anonymously 
by: 
(a) A student; 
(b) The parent, guardian, or close adult relative 
of a student; or 
(c) A school staff member. 
(2) The Department shall require a county board to 
report incidents of bullying, harassment, or 
intimidation against students attending a public 
school under the jurisdiction of the county board. 
(3) Each victim of bullying, harassment, or 
intimidation report form shall: 
(a) Identify the victim and the alleged 
perpetrator, if known; 
(b) Indicate the age of the victim and alleged 
perpetrator; 
(c) Describe the incident, including alleged 
statements made by the alleged perpetrator; 
(d) Indicate the location of the incident; 
(e) Identify any physical injury suffered by the 
victim and describe the seriousness and any 
permanent effects of the injury; 
(f) Indicate the number of days a student is 
absent from school, if any, as a result of the 
incident; 
(g) Identify any request for psychological 
services initiated by the victim or the victim's 
family due to psychological injuries suffered; 
and 
(h) Include instructions on how to fill out the 
form and the mailing address to where the form 
shall be sent. 
(4)  A county board shall distribute copies of the 
victim of bullying, harassment, or intimidation 
report form to each public school under the county 
board's jurisdiction. 
(5)  Each county board shall submit summaries of 
report forms filed with the county board to the State 
Board on or before January 31 each year. 
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(6) A county board shall delete any information that 
identifies an individual. 
(7) The information contained in a victim of 
bullying, harassment, or intimidation report form in 
accordance with subsection (3) of this section: 
(a) Is confidential and may not be disclosed again 
except as otherwise provided under the Family 
Education Rights and Privacy Act or this section 
when deemed necessary by the school or county board 
to protect the students involved, or other students; 
and 
(b) May not be made a part of a student’s 
permanent educational record.243 
(8) A school employee, school volunteer, student, or 
parent who promptly reports in good faith an act of 
bullying or harassment to the appropriate school official 
designated in the school district's policy and who makes 
this report in compliance with the procedures set forth in 
the policy is immune from a cause of action for damages 
arising out of the reporting itself or any failure to remedy 
the reported incident.244 
(9) To the extent state or federal funds are 
appropriated for the purposes of this statute, each 
school district shall: 
(a) Provide training on the harassment, 
intimidation or bullying policy to school 
employees and volunteers who have direct 
contact with students; and 
(b) Develop a process for educating students on 
the harassment, intimidation or bullying policy. 
(c) Information regarding the county board 
policy against harassment, intimidation or 
bullying shall be incorporated into each school’s 
current employee training program. 
(10) For use in the event of a properly reported incident 
according to the provisions of this statute, state, school, or 
county boards shall establish: 
(a) A procedure for providing immediate 
notification to the parents of a victim of bullying 
or harassment and the parents of the perpetrator 
                                                 
243 MD. CODE ANN., EDUC. § 7-424 (West 2008). 
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of an act of bullying or harassment, as well as 
notification to all local agencies where criminal 
charges may be pursued against the perpetrator. 
(b) A procedure to refer victims and 
perpetrators of bullying or harassment for 
counseling. 
(c) A procedure for regularly reporting to a 
victim’s parents the actions taken to protect the 
victim.245 
D. Commentary on the Proposed Model Statute 
This proposed Model Statute incorporates sections from the best-
drafted state anti-bullying statutes currently in force.  In each section, the 
language was enhanced to cover all the different types of bullying in a 
constitutional way.   
Harassment, as defined by Title VII and Title IX, informs the central 
definition of bullying in this proposed Model Statute.  The Supreme 
Court has found each of these statutes constitutional when challenged.  
In the school environment, prohibiting harassment based on sex is 
constitutional under Title IX.  Title VII has been found constitutional 
only in the workplace environment.  Nonetheless, students deserve at 
least as much protection from bullying and harassment in school as 
adults do in the workplace.  Providing students protection from bullying 
and harassment is only fair and no greater infringement than restrictions 
on workplace adult speech that have been found constitutional under 
Title VII. 
While R.A.V. seems to require strict scrutiny of any speech 
regulation that is content-based or establishes categories of speech, the 
special circumstances of the school environment require a different 
approach; the fact that the Court has not used R.A.V. in its subsequent 
student speech cases, such as Davis and Morse, is instructive.  It indicates 
that R.A.V. and its requirement of strict scrutiny will not be used by the 
Court to evaluate regulations of student speech in the school 
environment.  The proposed model statute avoids vagueness problems 
because it grants no discretion to school officials to sanction speech that 
is not described in the statute. 
The proposed Model Statute would reach all types of bullying, but 
its constitutionality would likely be challenged in the courts.  If the 
Supreme Court was to face a challenge of this proposed statute, it would 
need to recognize that while students have First Amendment rights, the 
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school environment is special.  Peculiar circumstances inherent in the 
school environment require allowing schools to take measures to prevent 
the potentially tragic consequences of bullying and to foster a better 
educational environment for the youth of America.  This national 
standard could be tested a single time to provide a definitive answer as 
to what conduct schools may prohibit to combat bullying. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
School bullying and harassment have resulted in violence and 
allowed an environment detrimental to learning to persist in public 
schools.  While protecting freedom of speech and respecting the power 
of the First Amendment are crucial to the American way of life, violence 
in American schools is a compelling reason to regulate First Amendment 
speech in the school environment.  Bullying is a problem in American 
schools and its tragic consequences have been witnessed time and again.  
Other consequences are not as visible, but every child who misses 
school, does not take advantage of an educational opportunity, or suffers 
poor grades due to bullying is another reason to remedy this problem. 
Current Supreme Court student speech jurisprudence does not allow 
schools to effectively combat bullying, and neither does any 
Congressional legislation.  While state anti-bullying statutes are valuable 
steps in the right direction, not all states have adopted legislation of this 
type.  Even those states with anti-bullying statutes in place have yet to 
face a challenge to their constitutionality.  A national standard would 
provide an opportunity to fully test the constitutionality of an anti-
bullying statute.  In addition, passing a national anti-bullying statute 
under the Spending Clause would allow Congress to make the statute 
applicable in all states and in all public schools across the nation. 
A national anti-bullying statute as proposed in this Note would 
allow schools to address all bullying, whether physical, verbal, or 
psychological.  The proposed model statute draws on Supreme Court 
standards for student speech, legislation dealing with sexual harassment 
in schools, and analogizes non-student speech legislation to the school 
environment.  The model statute combines the best sections of state anti-
bullying statutes to form a single, uniform, comprehensive standard. 
Passage of a federal anti-bullying statute raises the specter of a First 
Amendment challenge.  While the Supreme Court has been rather 
unbending in its school free speech jurisprudence, the potentially tragic 
consequences of bullying cannot truly be avoided without restricting 
some speech in schools.  If faced with a First Amendment challenge to 
this Note’s proposed Model Statute, the Court would need to exercise 
flexibility with its dogged protection of free speech in schools.  Various 
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state anti-bullying statutes have yet to be tested in court.  In balancing 
competing values and fully appreciating the consequences of 
unrestrained student free speech rights, the Supreme Court should 
conclude that to reach their full potential students need a safe school 
environment and protection from bullying.  If an anti-bullying statute 
such as the one proposed in this Note had been in place in Littleton, 
Colorado, perhaps the thirteen lives lost that day would still be with us 
today. 
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